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Abstract 
 
Understanding the reasons underlying income inequality has 
generated considerable interest in the last years and various 
theoretical analyses have been developed to explain international 
differences in income distribution between groups of countries at 
different stages of economic development. However, structural 
investigations of the contemporary effects of the forces shaping the 
evolution of income inequality are difficult to find. Moreover, little 
attention has been given to the increasing inequality 
merelyamongadvanced economies. For these reasons, we develop a 
theoretical framework to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
factors affecting income distribution in a particular set of advanced 
economies, the European Union countries, and utilize a fifteen year 
panel of 25 countries to identify the short term effects of several 
considerable determinants of household income inequality. On the 
basis of the main findings, we conclude providing some policy 
indications. 
 
JEL: C33, D31, I31, I32, I38. 
Key words:Household disposable income distribution, European 
Union, structural determinants, panel models. 
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Introduction 
 
After a period wherein redistribution as a topic of research has been 
somehow neglected, the inequality increase in many advanced 
countries has led the economists in the last two decades to care again 
about this issue. Thus, a new debate on the correct measures and the 
main determinants of income inequality has been raised, and 
Atkinson (1997) can be seen as the manifesto of this renew.  
In literature, there is a very large amount of analyses on inequality in 
labour incomes, where the attention is on individual wage variability 
by sectors, skills, professions and labour institutions (among others, 
Koeninger et al., 2007; Atkinson, 2008); fewer works focus on the 
variability of factor shares (labour and capital) of total income and 
the consequent inequality in rewards of different factors (as in 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003). Other studies, the most interesting 
for our analysis, deal with inequality in disposable incomes, formed 
by different labour incomes, government transfers (financed by 
taxations) and other forms of incomes (mainly, rents, interests on 
financial investments, dividends), where demographic, institutional, 
political, and social factorsshow their relevance. 
Along these lines, our focus is on the definition of household 
disposable income inequality and on its determinants. We are 
explicitly considering households, not individuals, since the 
observation points of disposable income distribution and the concept 
of inequality are referred not only to the individual earnings 
dispersion, as implicitly assumed in many analyses in literature, but 
to income of any sources. 
More specifically, our aim is to analyse the forces that shape 
inequality in household disposable income across the European 
Union, a particular sample of developed countries, which share a set 
of institutions, economic policy targets and social issues. Our 
approach differs from the various international comparative studies, 
since they include only some European countries as a subset of the 
OECD countries (among others, Atkinson et al., 2005; Forster and 
d’Ercole, 2005; OECD, 2011), or as a part of the distribution of 
income across the world (for example, Deininger and Squire, 1996; 
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Barro, 2000), or, again, as part of specific issues on poverty or social 
inclusion (for instance, Chen and Corak (2005) is concerned with 
child poverty; Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) with social mobility). A 
set of recent papers focuses on the dynamics of overall income 
inequality for the European Union taken as an aggregate, and the 
comparison of the whole Union with other selected OECD countries, 
namely the US (among others, BonesmoFredriksen, 2012; 
Dauderstadt and Kelmtek, 2011; Brandolini, 2007). Unlike these 
works,our analysis, starting with the basic assumption that the 
process of social cohesion is not completely fulfilled, stresses that it 
is worth studying income distribution for each European country, 
given their strong differences in terms of national “institutional” 
arrangements.  
The relevance of income distribution in the European Union (EU 
from now on) is due to its social and political implications, especially 
after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements and the consequent entrance of 
countries with average levels of income well below those of the EU-
15. As a consequence, the EU has become more heterogeneous. Such 
differences matter for the Union political goals to raise the standard 
of living and the quality of life of all citizens, and promote economic 
and social cohesion throughout the Union itself. Purposes that, first, 
have been stressed in the “Lisbon Agenda” and, then, reiterated, 
along with the relative strategies, in the “Europa 2020” program. The 
evolution of income inequality among different countries is a 
phenomenon that the EU has decided to monitor with particular 
emphasis. In fact, wide differences across countries in income 
distribution, degrees of inequality, taxation schemes, labour market 
structures and regulations must be taken into account and carefully 
supervised in the process towards fiscal unification (a long-run 
objective often declared by many European politicians), if the EU 
institutions intend to avoid undesirable results about the standard of 
living of European citizens.  
The literature lacks a thorough and comprehensive analysis of all the 
potential forces affecting the evolution of household disposable 
income inequality in EU, since some recent studies including 
institutional views of the determinants of inequalities in Europe are 
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concentrated on individual earnings dispersion (i.e., Beher and 
Potter, 2010) or on the specific issue of the integration process 
dynamics (as in Bertola, 2010).  
A specific attention to household perspective is worthwhile for 
European institutions and policies, given the recent weakening of 
traditional welfare States, the changes in family structure and the 
cultural evolution of the relationships between family members and 
generations. For these reasons, our work includes a broad set of 
determinants of income inequality, such as macroeconomic, 
institutional, cultural and social factors, and at the same time 
emphasizes the role of redistributive effects, due to public 
expenditure,which are more relevant for a wider comprehension of 
the dimensions affecting household disposable income inequality and 
for a more precise targeting of the cohesion of policy measures for 
European countries. Growing income inequality is knownto lead to 
economic, political and social problems, such as increased (relative 
or absolute) poverty, greater inequalities of income and wealth in 
subsequent generations, the weakening of social cohesion, and 
slower economic growth in the long run. Our hypothesis is that a 
household perspective, explicitly modelled in a wider frame,can be 
enlightening and can reinforce many of the above results for the 
specific set of EU countries.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, guided by the 
literature results, we provide a theoretical analysis of the main 
economic, social and institutional causes of household income 
inequality and discuss their expected results for the EU countries. 
Section 3 presents the specification of the model andthe variables 
used,and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses the 
econometric results. Section 5 concludes the study and offers some 
policy indications. 
 
1. Structural, social and institutional determinants of inequalities in 
household income distribution 
 
To explain international differences in income distribution, various 
theories have been developed and several empirical analyses have 
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been done to test their relevance. Our study on European countries 
relies on these theories and analyses, which provide the “guide lines” 
to define a theoretical framework able to depict the numerous issues 
affecting inequality and define the empirical strategy to check their 
importance. 
In the literature debate, the first line emphasises the impact of 
macroeconomic performance, in particular of economic growth, as a 
determinant of inequalities in (individual labour) income. A second 
trend underlines the role of structural determinants such as the 
composition of employment (by sector, qualification and education, 
mainly due to technological changes); the demographic 
characteristics of population (and, in fewer cases, households); and 
the relevance of sociological, political and cultural constraints in 
class and intergenerational mobility. A third line stresses the role of 
redistributive policy instruments, different welfare state regimes in 
general, or specific policy systems and collective choices. Each 
welfare state regime can be related to a particular income 
distribution, which depends on the incidence of redistributive 
programmes and the amount of public expenditure, which in turn are 
the results of more or less equalitarian choices and political 
preferences of the national electorate. Finally, few studies 
concentrate on the role of institutions, with particular emphasis on 
the degree of democracy in less developed countries or on the 
relevance of economic freedoms in more advanced countries (for 
example, Alesina and Perotti, 1996).  
 
On the whole, all these research lines allow identifying the forces 
shaping income inequality in Europe. Formally, our theoretical 
paradigm can be expressed as:  
 
IE = f (ECON, STRUCT, EXP, INST, RES)                                   (1) 
 
where IE, the (chosen) measure of income InEquality, depends on 
ECONomic measures of the macroeconomic performance; on 
STRUCTural variables concerning the labour market, the population, 
the household structure; on public EXPenditure for social and 
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redistributive proposals to individuals and families; on the 
INSTitutions that can guarantee more or less economic freedoms in 
the markets and equal opportunity to citizens; and on other RESidual 
factors, which can be specific of each country and over time. 
 
1.1. MacroECONomic performance 
 
Economic growth is the most traditional macroeconomic determinant 
of inequality, following the theoretical and empirical literatureand, 
more recently, also the globalization effects on world competition are 
considered in many analyses, given the unsatisfactory results1 of the 
previous approaches to explain the increase of inequality in advanced 
countries. 
The more cited contributions in literature, starting from the seminal 
study of Kuznets (1955), concentrate on the relationship between 
inequality and growth in the long run. On this basis, it is supposed 
that, in the initial stages of the development process, the link should 
be positive and, at a later stage, with further developments of the 
economy, the link itself could become negative. This formulation 
implies that a change in inequality should be the result of the 
expansion of a high income modern sector of the economy at the 
expense of a low income traditional one.  
The literature presents arguments in favour and others against all 
these conclusions with respect to the inevitability of the development 
                                                 
1 The more recent debate in the empirical literature seems to underline that, in 
general, the link between growth and inequality depends strongly on the length of 
time horizon, on the quality and homogeneity of disposable data on inequality 
measures (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2009) and on the use of panels instead of cross-
country techniques (Forster, 2000) in the econometric analysis. A recent study 
investigating cross-country links between the rate of growth and inequality 
concludes that among developed countries growth could be even distributional 
neutral on average (Ravallion, 2004); it is not growth per se that affects inequality 
but the way in which growth is produced and what are the specific effects in each 
country. Others analyses (Bourguignon, 2005) remark the relevance of structural, 
cultural and institutional characteristics of each country in conditioning the specific 
effects of growth on income inequality. 
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process (Atkinson, 2001) and to the direct causation emerging from 
the inverted-U Kuznets curve (Ravaillon and Chen, 1997). In many 
panel data analyses, the impact of growth on inequality is weak or 
not significant (Frazer, 2006), while some researches (Cornia and 
Court, 2001) find a U shaped relation between growth and inequality 
by using a hypothesis different from the Kuznets study. There is an 
“efficient inequality range” so that very low and very high degrees of 
inequality tend to slow growth, while inequalities in the middle range 
represent a more favourable environment for economic development.  
This interpretation deserves attention in our analysissince it is well 
known that in EU there is a first group of countries (especially, the 
Nordic) with low income inequality, a second group (mainly, the 
Mediterranean countries) with high inequality and a third group with 
a medium level of inequality. More recent statistics seem to show 
that the New Member countries belong to each of the previous 
groups and this means that there is not a strong concentration of 
these countries on the middle range regime favouring economic 
development.Nevertheless, even if common institutions are working 
to reduce the gap in macroeconomic growth between more and less 
dynamic countries, it is plausible that the EU enlargement may have 
modified both the intensity of the link growth-inequalityalong time 
and the weight of the between and within country differences in 
income inequality. 
Policies aimed to reduce those gaps in economic performances and to 
enlarge social cohesion among new and old member countries have 
been traditionally used by EU institutions;however, the structural 
differences remain relevant. This relevance can justify an analysis of 
the determinants of income inequality that includes a wide set of 
other factors, together with the macroeconomic ones, as we are going 
to develop in our model. Moreover, the mechanisms underlying the 
link between growth and income distribution need to be clarified 
further for a set of countries where national redistributive policies are 
relevant, paying particular attention on the role of various institutions 
transferring macroeconomic growth to social developments and, via 
the social interrelationships, to individual and family well-beings. 
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The aim of our study is along this perspective, since we want to 
analyse income distribution in European Union and we are 
considering the impact of macroeconomic performance on (earning) 
inequality as part of a model, where structural, social and 
institutional variables are also included, in line with the set of 
literature on the so-called augmented Kuznets hypothesis (Milanovic, 
1994). We expect, as in the mainstream analysis on developed 
countries, a negative (perhaps not very strong but significant) link 
between growth and income inequalities, mainly via inequality of 
(individual) earnings between sectors of the economy. Earning 
dispersion depends, directly, on differences in productivity dynamics 
and/or, indirectly, on employment adjustments (which could be 
related, broadly speaking, to education attainments, to public 
expenditure and to social mobility). Productivity growth effects are 
expected to be more relevant among the EU new entrants, mainly 
Eastern countries, where the technological catching up has continued 
during the more recent years. In addition, the employment dynamics 
can be linked, for all the countries, to other structural variables 
related to demographic and household characteristics, education 
achievements and labour markets institutions as well as 
macroeconomic growth.  
To complete this section, it is worth noting that many models in 
literature include the degree of openness of the economy among the 
macroeconomic determinants of inequality. However, by using 
different indices of openness, the main results about developed 
countries are ambiguous in understanding the links between growth, 
globalisation and inequality. Moreover, in most of the analyses about 
Europe, the relationships are not clear and strong, probably because 
the discrepancies in the degree of openness are not so large and tend 
to follow common time paths related to the degree of development 
and economic growth (a recent survey for OECD countries is in 
Chusseau et al., 2008 and in OECD, 2011). Given this evidence, we 
treat the specific effects of globalisation, not explained by growth, in 
the set of RESidual determinants. 
Empirically (Section 4),to get a better insight of the impact of 
macroeconomic performance on income distribution, we evaluate the 
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hypothesis of different intensity of the link growth-inequality 
analyzing separately the model for the set of countries with a higher 
rate of growth; then, we study theimpact of the productivity growth 
effectsfor the EU new entrants,running a separate regression for the 
set of “Western” (older) countries2; finally, we compare the growth 
estimated coefficientson different measures of inequality.  
 
1.2. STRUCTural changes 
 
After having discussed the impact of macroeconomic performance, 
we complete the previous analysis by considering the role of 
structural changes on inequality. To do this, we follow three 
steps.First (section 2.2.1), we further study the link development-
inequality, which can explain earnings dispersion, by including 
explicitly structural effects on individual earning inequality. Second 
(section 2.2.2), we introduce additional evidence from the theoretical 
and empirical debate about structural changes, which can explain 
household labour income distribution, instead of individual earnings 
dispersion. Finally, (section 2.2.3), we concentrate on those 
structural changes that are crucial for what is our main interest of 
research, which is household total income inequality. The focus is on 
the impact of structural changes on inequality of incomes of any 
source, not only labour income as in the previous sections.  
 
1.2.1. Structural determinants of individual earnings inequality 
 
Growth (and globalisation) might have distributional consequences 
and one channel is the process of skill-biased technological change, 
which can impact on between-group earning differentials. A 
common argument is that earnings inequality increase in the 
developed countries is a result of technological change that tends to 
raise the productivity of higher educated people; the consequence of 
higher productivity may be wage premium for education, which 
tends to raise more if there is a shortage of educated people in the 
                                                 
2 The new EU members are the countries that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007. 
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short run (for a review, see Aghion et al. 1999 or Gottschalk and 
Smeeding 1997). Sudden technological changes might also change 
the steepness of the age-earning profile, if the education of younger 
people may be more adapted to the requirements of new technologies 
than the skills of older workers. The labour demand will increase 
more for the younger educated people and less for older workers, 
which will result in a less steep age-earning profile. This effect, 
hence, may compensate the impact of the experience gained on the 
job, which in turn tends to favour the older workers than the younger 
ones in terms of labour income distribution.  
Along this debate, the effects of technological changes on cross-
country (earning) inequality could be not homogeneous as they are 
related to structural characteristics of each economy. In particular, 
this between countries variability is produced by (i) different 
combinations of shares of young and mature people in the 
demographic structure; (ii) labour market related institutional 
characteristics that can have different impact on technological 
changes on employment and earning profiles and (iii) education 
levels that can introduce more or less shortage of skilled people. 
Hence, national structural changes in the demographic composition 
of labour force, in employment by sectors of the economyand in 
education attainments of working age population3 can produce 
different impact on earning inequality between countries and, as a 
result, on total income distribution in Europe.  
 
1.2.2. Determinants of household labour market inequality 
 
Once considered the effects of structural change on individual 
earning dispersion, it is important to consider such effects on 
household labour income inequality. More specifically, as inequality 
indices are typically related to household disposable income, it is 
                                                 
3 The employment determinants are more extensively considered in the next sub-
paragraph, while the link between education attainments and inequality is analysed 
in the following paragraphs (2.3 and 2.4). The structural composition of the 
population and labour force are never significant in our model and thus are 
neglected. 
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necessary to focus on the household structure and, because of this, 
the individual earnings dispersion has to be transformed, first, in 
household labour market inequality and, then, in household total 
income inequality. 
The most relevant transformation in European labour market in the 
last decades has been the increase of employment, due mainly to a 
raise in female participation. This evolution of female labour force is 
strongly related to changes in household structure. Consequently, the 
analysis of structural determinants on inequality requiresto move 
from the individual perspective towards a household one. For 
instance, a given employment increase could reduce inequality 
among individuals in each country, since it increases the number of 
those with labour income and reduces the jobless. But the impact of 
the employment raise on cross-country distribution of household 
labour income is more ambiguous to evaluate, as we need to consider 
the family compositions (i.e., the number of dependents and/or 
jobless) and the different correlations between earnings (price-effect) 
and employment (quantity-effect) of household members in working 
age, which again can produce different degrees of concentration of 
labour incomes in households with specific characteristics. 
Employment increases (mainly due to female participation in many 
EU countries) can have direct positive effects in reducing disposable 
income inequality if they tend to reduce the proportion of those 
living in jobless households, and therefore they contribute to a more 
equitable distribution of labour income between households. 
Moreover, if employment increases are concentrated in particular 
high skilled sectors and favour higher educated people, they can 
contribute indirectly to raise (earning) inequality between 
households, via educational premium, especially in societies with 
less social and professional mobility, and where the family 
background is particularly relevant.  
Consequently, it is worthwhile to focus on structural effects that are 
more pertinent to a deeper understanding of household labour 
income inequality instead of individual earnings dispersion. Some 
analysis of the European Observatory on the Social Situation and 
Demography (a summary of four years researches of the SSO is 
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presented in Ward et al., 2009), based on static decompositions 
measures of income inequality, show that education of the household 
head is the most important structural factor in explaining income 
inequality among European countries and that both households 
structure and education explain the highest proportion of total 
inequality in countries where the effect of education are the strongest 
ones.Given these results, the education and the related employment 
status of the household head lead (individual) earnings dispersion to 
household earnings inequality4, since they can be used as a good 
proxy of the household labour involvement. Household labour 
inequality can be explained as well by the inclusion of total hours 
worked by all the members of the households (labour intensity)5 
instead of using information only on household head characteristics. 
Labour intensity is expected, following the literature, to increase 
income inequality and is strongly dependent on household 
composition, since it is higher in households with more (educated) 
working age members and fewer dependents (young children) or 
other jobless components. Labour income differences arise according 
to the number of very young children in families with a working age 
household head, since this particular family composition can 
condition the participation of one parent in the labour force6 and 
reduces labour intensity. But parents’ labour supply is in turn 
depending on labour market arrangements, the effectiveness of 
conciliation policies and the availability of public care services. 
Therefore, for a better understanding of the relationship between 
labour intensity and inequality, it is important to investigate how the 
                                                 
4 Men’s earning dispersion is the main determinant driving household labour income 
inequality in 23 OECD (18 European) countries from mid-1980s to mid-2000s, 
contributing between one-third to one-half of the overall increase (OECD, 2011).   
5 We do not have enough data to determine measures of labour intensity for all the 
countries and for the whole period and for this reason we cannot include such a 
variable in our panel.  
6 A recent analysis for OECD countries shows that the inclusion in the labour force 
of part-time workers, who are relevant in EU as they are typically mothers of young 
children, contributed to increase earnings distribution dispersion since part-timers 
are more concentrated in low paid jobs and have less career development prospects 
(OECD, 2011; Sandor, 2011). 
16 
 
employment transformations affect the distribution of labour income 
among households. Some analyses show the presence of employment 
polarisation effects on the distribution of (labour) income (Redmond 
and Kattuman, 2001) due to the evidence that the distribution of 
employed people among households is becoming more unequal. 
Both an increase in the proportion of jobless households and of 
households with multiple workers can be found. There is 
international evidence that changes in family formation rather than 
demographic ones can influence income inequality (Harkness, 2010). 
The increase, on one side, of the share of single-parent families 
combined with a rising relevance, and on the other, of the so called 
“assortative mating” hypothesis (high correlation of income and 
social status between partners in couples) have produced a higher 
inequality that may compensate the equalising impact of women’s 
employment increase (OECD, 2011). There is evidence that 
employment rates increase more among wives of men in the top 
rather than in the bottom earnings deciles and that those spouses do 
not earn lower wages than those of low-earning husbands. Hence, the 
employment polarisation effect can increase household income 
inequality via a higher concentration of labour incomes at the top 
decile of the distribution.  
Good statistics to estimate (across countries and over time) such 
hypotheses of employment polarisation on one side, and of 
assortative mating on the other, are hard to find. We then concentrate 
on the household characteristics, trying to identify by reasoning a 
likely proxy for the household labour involvement. Specifically, the 
increase of jobless households can be related to the raise of single 
parents with young children, who face difficulties in conciliating 
work and family care and, more generally, the presence of children is 
likely to reduce the probability to have multiple workers in 
households and/or to have both parents working full-time. The share 
of households with children7 could be a broad proxy of the 
                                                 
7 In our model, employment and unemployment measures are never significant in 
explaining household income inequalities even when we try different disaggregation 
by gender, age, professional qualifications; the share of workless households is 
significant only in some cases and the estimated impact not robust. By using the 
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household labour involvement, measuring different cumulated 
effects on income inequality: a weaker participation to labour market 
in one-parent family is a factor increasing inequality (that can off-set 
the equalising effect of employment rise, especially for mothers) and 
a lower concentration of labour income for multi-workers households 
is related to a decrease of income inequality (that can off-set the 
likely increase of inequality if one parent works part-time). We 
expect that the prevailing effect of the share of households with 
children on inequality could be related, as well, to cultural 
differences on the social role of mothers and that a social consensus 
on working mothers can also favour the diffusion of public children 
care and conciliation policies in each country. The impact of such 
cultural determinants on household income distribution may 
significantly explain between countries variability, but as they are 
difficult to measure homogenously in a panel, in line with the 
literature results, they are treated as a RESidual factor in our model. 
 
1.2.3. Determinants of household income inequality 
 
Moving from household labour income to disposable income 
distribution - the concept of income we are considering in our model 
- requires the inclusion of resources of other sources. This means 
taking into account all earnings, public transfers and capital incomes 
that are at family members’ disposal. In the previous paragraph 
(2.2.2), we have already implicitly considered all components of 
labour income8; the topic of public transfers will be discussed 
                                                                                                       
share of households with children, we take account, indirectly, of the mothers’ 
disincentive to participate in the labour market, which can reduce the probability to 
have two workers in the households and, at the same time, raise the probability to 
have a jobless household in the case of single-parent families.       
8 We have not considered in the previous analyses any distinction between wages, 
salaries and self-employment income, and therefore we have introduced (at least) 
two kinds of approximation. First, that the shares of labour earnings and of self-
employment follow a common path among EU countries; second, the shares have 
the same impact on total inequality. There is evidence that in advanced countries, 
especially in Europe, self-employment is correlated to economic cycles; that self-
employment income can be associated with a larger inequality than other earnings 
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extensively in the next section (2.3).Now,our main consideration is 
on the trends of capital income in Europe and their impact on 
inequality. This analysis can complete also the understanding of the 
macroeconomic link between structural changes (related to growth 
effects in developed countries) and inequality. We can find in the 
literature, a minority debate, probably requiring further research, on 
the relationship between factor income shares composition and 
personal distribution. Those studies underline that the effects of 
technological changes on household income distribution could 
depend indirectly on the distribution of the increase in value-added 
between capital and labour, favouring the first factor share as a 
consequence of economic development (Spector, 2004).This rise in 
capital share could eventually convey to a structural increase in 
capital disposable income share and consequently more inequality, 
since capital income is much more unevenly distributed to 
households than is labour income in almost all the developed 
countries (Fraßdorf et al., 2008). If a small number of households can 
gain very high income from business capitals and other investments, 
as a consequence of a raise of the share of capital in the value-added 
of the economy, income inequality is likely to increase. The 
relationship between factor shares and personal distribution has some 
complexity and it is not opportune to translate empirical results from 
the former to the latter in many European countries without further 
research (this is the warning in Atkinson, 2007). 
In general, inequality of disposable income can rise if a particular 
source of income becomes more unequally distributed; if the share of 
such source of income increases; if a particular source of income is 
allocated in such a way to favour the rich. European statistics 
underline that the share of labour income is on average about 3/4 of 
total disposable income if we include the share of self-employment 
income. Both these shares of household labour income tend to be 
relatively stable in the last twenty years across countries and their 
                                                                                                       
and that the development of inequality among self-employment has little effect on 
inequality among all workers (OECD, 2011). Self-employment income is often not 
fully reported and difficult to evaluate; therefore, we do not include this 
decomposition.    
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contribution to total inequality tend to slightly reduce after the mid-
90s (the period we are considering) and mostly at the bottom of the 
distribution in many countries. The share of capital income, which 
rewards the household sector, is about 5-7% on average (this has 
slightly increased in the last decade in each country, due to financial 
market performances and it is more concentrated only in rich 
households) and the residual share (about 20%) is given largely by 
public transfers to individuals and families mainly at the bottom of 
the distribution, as we will see in the next section. Finally, in each 
country we have a very small share of disposable income that is 
related to private transfers between individuals, frequently linked by 
family relationships,which is distributional neutral and can be 
neglected. Therefore, the empirical data on EU support, first, a global 
stability in the medium term of the shares in disposable income 
between capital, labour and government transfers, and, second, 
thatthe contribution of each share to total income inequality can be 
considered broadly constant. For this reason, we are not including 
explicitly this kind of structural change in our model. Given this 
evidence on time stability, we are considering implicitly income 
shares decomposition among the RESidual effects,since we may 
have structural differences in income shares that are specific for each 
country.  
 
1.3. Redistributive EXPenditures and social policies. 
 
Public finance and government social policies produce distributional 
effects, generally positive, which can be evaluated from different 
perspectives in terms of their effectiveness to reduce income 
inequality. In the traditional debate on European welfare states, the 
effectiveness of public social policies in reducing inequality mainly 
depends, on one side, on the opportune balance between cash 
transfers (normally means-tested) and in-kind benefits (mainly 
universal services) and, on the other, on the correct targeting 
mechanisms of the transfers (or tax reductions) for specific groups of 
population.  
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Hence, the variability of social policies between countries may be 
still significant, even if the redistributive role of the welfare state is 
generally weakening in the EU, especially in the last decade, due to 
public finance restrictions. Following these lines, in the next 
sections, we discuss the respective role of monetary and in-kind 
benefits in reducing inequality (section 2.3.1.) and the redistributive 
effects of public expenses on different groups of population (section 
2.3.2.). 
 
1.3.1. The role of cash transfers and benefits in-kind 
 
As done in the empirical literature, our model employs statistics of 
equivalised household disposable income to define inequality 
measures (Sections 3 and 4). Hence, we are implicitly considering, 
on one side, some dimensions of family composition (via 
equivalence scales) and, on the other, the redistributive effects 
related to taxes and benefits on gross incomes. The available 
statistics on disposable income include monetary benefits (mainly 
social security benefits) and exclude taxes and employees social 
security contributions. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that some sort 
of redistribution has already been included via taxation. Furthermore, 
as we are using a definition of monetary income, data on income in 
kind are not considered, including free benefits from public services 
such as health, primary education and child care services that are not 
supplied by cash. Since there is evidence (among others, Paulus et 
al., 2010) that, first, in many EU countries benefits in-kind (as a 
percentage of GDP) are more relevant than the ones in cash and, 
second, that benefits could be more redistributive than taxation, their 
effects on income inequality, in the set of the redistributive 
policies,should be, at least indirectly, taken into account. 
Even for the more widespread cash transfers discussed in the 
literature, we could have different redistributive impacts. Especially 
after the mid-90s, some analyses support the conclusion that public 
monetary benefits are relaxing their equalising effects on household 
income distribution in many EU countries, since only in few cases 
they introduce more progressivity in the targeting mechanisms via 
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means-tested reforms. Nevertheless, as in the literature (Bargain and 
Callan, 2010; Dardoni and Lambert, 2002), we expect that the social 
expenditure (for transfers in cash) will maintain a negative 
relationship with income distribution for EU countries and, in 
general, high variability between (rather than within) the countries 
that are monitored.  
As a first specific contribution to the debate, we try to enlarge the 
definition of social expenditure as a determinant of household 
income inequality.Normally, the empirical models in the literature 
use only the share of social protection expenditure, in relation to 
GDP, as the redistributive determinant of inequality. In this way, the 
other components of public expenditure (for our purpose, basically 
expenditure on health and compulsory education) are not considered, 
though they areregarded as universal services, which produce 
benefits in the more complete systems of welfare state of many EU 
countries (Esping-Andersen et.al., 2002). Therefore, it is generally 
assumed9 that these benefits in kind are allocated in a way that can be 
implicitly considered as distributional neutralbetween households 
and among groups of population. Since a standard methodology for 
the imputation and enough statistics of good quality are not 
available, we prefer to include those benefits in kind (related only to 
health and education) in the aggregate of social expenditure, as a 
global determinant of redistributive effects of public policies on 
household income inequality.  
Public expenditure on health can be relevant for the well-being, 
especially, of very young children, disabled and old people. It can 
contribute to reduce inequalities in the all society, whether the richest 
share of population pays more (via progressive taxes on income) for 
the universal service, and whether equal opportunity and correct 
information guarantee the effective access to the service to all the 
citizens in the same conditions. These are the declared characteristics 
of the national health services in many EU countries, mainly the 
Nordic ones, where the taxation structures are more progressive 
                                                 
9 In few recent analyses (i.e., Vaalavuo, 2010), the evaluation of extended disposable 
income inequality measures (including benefits of publicly provided services) are 
proposed. 
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(even on cash benefits) and the access to services is effective and 
widespread to all who are in need. 
The same argument can be used for theeducation expenditure.In this 
case, the links with income inequality can be even straighter and 
stronger, but less homogenous acrosscountries, than health public 
services. Primary and lower secondary education, as healthcare, 
present the characteristic of universal service in many EU countries, 
although this is not true for higher education levels. We have already 
noted (Section 2.2.2) that (tertiary) education could be one of the 
main determinants of individual earning inequality in Europe and so 
the role of governments to guarantee the enrolment of young people 
from lower family backgrounds can represent a public policy aimed 
to reduce inequality even in the long run. Public expenditure on 
higher education is,in the international scenario, a peculiarity of 
some European welfare systems, since governments commonly 
believe that this can incentive class mobility (as we will discuss in 
the next paragraph) and reduce the income related inequalities10. 
Defining a broader aggregate of public transfers than in literature, we 
want to verify whether the inclusion of health and education in social 
expenditure can have a stronger (and negative) effect on inequality, 
given the weight of these benefits in kind in public expenditure for 
many EU countries. Considering different welfare state regimes and 
relevant between countries variability, to evaluate implicitly the 
impact of public transfers and social policies in reducing 
inequalities,our model is separately run over the countries thatexhibit 
larger social expenditures. 
 
1.3.2. The redistributive effects between groups of population 
 
Each welfare system has different redistributive impact on income 
distribution and in the more recent years new reforms to correct 
specific inefficiencies have been introduced.Even considering the 
                                                 
10 In the literature, we can find analyses showing that complete public financing of 
tertiary education, aimed to reduce liquidity constraints, can be fiscally regressive 
and not equitable from a social point of view (Chapman, 2006; OECD, 2008).  
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impactof such corrections, the balance between benefits and 
taxation,which characterizes each system, can be a relevant factor 
explaining between country variability of redistributive policy 
determinants. In fact, governments influence income distribution 
basically by the combined system of benefits and personal taxes. 
Taxes tend to be more progressive (especially for single people and 
childless couples) and benefits are normally targeted at the poor or at 
people with particular needs. The extent of this redistribution can 
vary significantly across countries, depending not only on the scale 
of social security regimes, on the universality of publicly provided 
services and on the total personal tax burden, but also on how 
benefits are targeted towards individuals and families. 
In particular, the analysis of this balance, which is expected to be 
important for the purpose of our model on household income 
inequality, requires a brief comment about the share of benefits, 
mainly public pensions and health services, transferred to old people. 
This somehow completes also the study of the impact of income 
shares decomposition on inequality we have developed previously.  
As already mentioned, a share of 20-25% of total household income 
in many EU countries is not due to labour and/or capital incomes: it 
consists of government transfers, mainly elderly benefits, as showed 
in many statistics (Eurostat, 2011). In fact,the main monetary 
resources for elderly population in Europe consist of public pensions, 
since private pensions are virtually non-existent with a few notable 
exceptions (for example, the Anglo-Saxon regime). Thus, a large 
share of public benefits, especially if social insurance contributions 
are not well calibrated, is designated to old people and this can 
represent one of the most important channelsof redistributive policies 
between groups across EU countries11.  
Given this evidence, we are proposing awider definition of public 
expenditure for social purposes than the traditional one, which 
                                                 
11 An OECD recent analysis (2011), which includes many EU countries, shows that 
in the last two decades the share of “non-elderly” benefits declines in overall public 
social expenditure; spending on non-elderly benefits tend to be less cyclical than 
other social expenditures, even if they include unemployment benefits, which follow 
the growth patterns (Immervoll and Richardson, 2011). 
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includes mainly social security benefits targeted to elderly people. 
Hence, by including the public expenditure on universal services 
(health and education, in our case) in the redistributive determinant 
of inequality, the composition of household across countries could be 
at least as relevant as age in explaining changes in income 
distribution.Moreover, the redistributive role of welfare policies 
towards different groups of population (families, children, jobless 
and disabled of different ages) has to be monitored carefully as well. 
Some researches indicate that the support for children and families in 
the EU is not homogeneous and mainly less generous than the 
benefits to the elderly. The share of families with children can be 
seen as the extent of population that is less privileged in the 
redistribution policies, even considering that public expenditure for 
pre-school, child care and educational subsidized services are 
normally addressed only to households with children andthat poverty 
subsidies and food benefits are more generous for lone parents or 
larger families. 
This evidence enlarges the number of plausible links between the 
share of household with children and disposable income inequality.It 
reinforcessomehow the hypothesis of a positive relationship with 
inequality measures, via between demographic groups’ effects, since 
old people live in small (basically single) families and mainly in 
childless households. These two types of households (singles 
andchildless couples), if the head is old and retired, receive a 
relatively larger share of net transfers from Governments for 
redistributive purposes than family with children, whose head is 
normally younger and in working age. 
 
1.4. INSTitutions, opportunities and social mobility 
 
The last set of determinants of disposable income inequality we are 
going to discuss is related to the role of institutions. In literature, the 
debate, in a multi-disciplinary and more general sense, is very wide. 
Due to this, we choose to concentrate on the institutions more 
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directly affecting household income distribution and mainly related 
to the links between families, society and markets12. 
The frame in which the role of institutions can be better reconsidered 
is given by the theoretical and empirical debate on inequality of 
opportunities. The extent to which people life chances are affected 
by their family background (parents’ income and wealth, social 
relations, education level, job status) and how far it is possible for 
someone to escape from less advantaged background provides a 
measure of social mobility. Thus, social class immobility can be 
related to strong links between family generations, via transmissions 
of wealth, social and political relations and professional status. They 
produce an indication of the existing constraints within a given 
society on personal advancement and, on the contrary, of the 
effective opportunities to overcome the obstacles arising from the 
negative circumstances where a person happens to be born. 
Removing such obstacles - which limit the achievement of true 
equality of opportunity to people and do not guarantee to attain the 
full potential for rising living standards - is one of the main 
objectives of EU social cohesion programs (for a more complete 
analysis on EU cohesion policies, see, among others, GHK, 2010).  
Along this approach, our model considers only the constraints to the 
living standards increase more related to economic determinants and 
interprets social mobility as intergenerational mobility, due to the 
relationships among family members, mainly via education and 
professional status (given a set of labour market regulations) and via 
wealth transmission. There is wide evidence in the economic 
literature about the impact of family background on education and 
job status, while the latter effect related to wealth transmission is not 
taken into account adequately. Our original contribution to the debate 
is to include a proxy of intergenerational (im)mobility, due to wealth 
                                                 
12 As the degree of overall democracy in EU countries, despite the recent 
enlargements of the Union, can be assumed nearly homogeneous (Polity IV Country 
Report, 2010), our attention will be concentrated on the institutional arrangements 
governing those economic sectors where public interventions and governments 
regulation activities can be more effective (Section 2.4.2). 
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transmission, as a factor that can play a rolein theincome inequalities 
increase in Europe.  
 
1.4.1. Equality of opportunities and social mobility 
 
The economic literature on the measurement of inequality of 
opportunities is not wide (for examples, Villar, 2006; World Bank, 
2006) and is basically concentrated on the so called ex-ante 
approach. Along this reasoning, there is equality of opportunities if 
the set of opportunities is the same for all individuals, regardless of 
their circumstances. Instead, the alternative ex-post approach 
proposes that there is equality of opportunities if all those who exert 
the same effort obtain the same outcome. The first approach, in the 
empirical analysis, is generally measured with a positive correlation 
between equality of opportunities and education investment, whereas 
the second approach introduces a positive correlation with labour 
market institutions. The results for both approaches are not always 
homogeneous and strong (either geographically or temporally) and 
so they probably need further researches and developments. 
Although recently there have been a wave of theoretical 
contributions on this topic and new empirical results focusing on the 
relevance of policies that could reduce income inequalities via a 
control on inequality of opportunities, the analyses on Europe are 
few. There is some new evidence about the importance of inequality 
of opportunities as one of the main inequality determinants for the 
whole income distribution (among others, Checchi et al., 2010). In 
particular, Marrero and Rodriguez (2012) find that correcting 
inequality of opportunity would not only result in a fairer society but 
it would also channel economic efficiency and growth, and in this 
way reduce income inequality; Aristei and Perugini (2012) 
emphasise the importance of institutional factors, which characterise 
different groups of EU countries, and propose that appropriate policy 
drivers are required to reduce inequalities, via a rise of social 
mobility in specific European contexts.   
Following a more general and traditional debate, high level of 
inequality of opportunities via social backgrounds is problematic for 
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a society because inequality in the parents’ generation leads to 
income inequality in subsequent generations. The transmission of 
ability within the family, plus income-related inequalities in 
education investment, can conduct to inequalities in the earnings and 
incomes of the children generation (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 2002; 
d’Addio, 2007). The literature on intergenerational mobility 
extensively shows that there is a persistent link between parents and 
children educational attainments in modern society (Roemer, 1998; 
Black and Devereux, 2010). This link between family generations is 
even more relevant since higher education could be related to better 
professional status and wage premium in many countries (Iannelli, 
2002). A report of EC (2008) on EU countriesshows that,given 
labour market institutions, the educational level of someone’s father 
seems to have in general more influence on the job of young people 
than their father occupations; individuals seem to have more chance 
to have a high occupational status, if their father has a tertiary level 
of education than if their father also has a high level job.   
The expansion of education is an important determinant of 
equalisation of educational opportunities and certainly, over the last 
century, most European countries experienced a general increase of 
the average level of schooling. However, with respect to higher 
education, as national dynamics have been rather different, the share 
of graduated people remains quite uneven. In Europe, there exists a 
remarkable variation in educational outcomes both in terms of levels 
and dispersion; especially in the late schooling countries, the level of 
educational inequalities is still important (Breen and Jonsson, 2007).  
In general terms, if on the whole the proportion of people entering 
the educational system increases, more people from less favourable 
backgrounds are likely to enter too. 
Given the relevant contribute of public expenditure to education in 
Europe, the association between social family background and young 
people educational attainment can be less significant than elsewhere 
and, consequently, the “odds” ratio can be more easily reduced. 
Notwithstanding,the sociological literature (Shavit et al. (eds.), 2007) 
indicates that social inequalities are resistant to changes in many 
advanced countries, including some EU members. 
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There isalso evidence that different regulations and policy 
approaches to public education investments are importantto explain 
between country variability in Europe. Social and family background 
can introduce inequalities between higher and lower education 
attainment, especially in those countries where we have shorter 
duration of compulsory schooling, early tracking in the system, 
higher academic access selection and greater variance in the quality 
of school organization, accountability and educational institutions by 
region, area, social environments (Marks, 2005; Braga et al, 2011). 
Hence, different cultural determinants and the operation of 
institutional factors and policies on education are expected to 
produce some country variations in the extent to which the origin 
families could affect younger generation educational attainments. 
Family backgrounds are expected to favour an increase in income 
inequality via unfair opportunities for younger generations. 
Along these lines, which justify the presence of educational 
inequalities among EU countries, we assess the (im)mobility effects 
due to education, “weighting” the tertiary school enrolment rate by 
the degree of correlation between younger and older generations, in 
order to account of the role of the family educational background on 
younger people education chances. The effect of this proxy of 
intergenerational transmission of social opportunities is expected to 
be significant in increasing household income inequality even in the 
last decades.  
 
1.4.2. Labour market institutions and inequalities 
 
There are two plausible links involved in the increasing of income 
inequality via social (im)mobility. First, young people with highly 
educated parents have higher chances to achieve higher educational 
qualifications (previous section 2.4.1). Second, these high 
qualifications are crucial for securing better occupational destination 
for younger generations. There is evidence that the causality of these 
two processes cannot be taken for granted in the case of some EU 
countries given their institutional frame. Since they may mitigate the 
social immobility effects and break the links between education 
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inequality and earnings inequality, the role of European labour 
market institutions must be considered. 
In the literature, we can find some analyses on the positive link 
between equality in opportunities and labour market regulations. To 
provide a measure of labour market characteristics and institutions, 
proxies related to the share of unionization of workers, degree of 
coordination of wage bargaining procedure, unemployment benefits 
regulation, minimum wages coverage (and so on) are normally 
introduced.The general hypothesis is, on one side, that the more a 
labour market is heavily regulated, the less the wage determination is 
related to individual features: this can reduce individual income 
variability and therefore wage inequalities. But, on the other side, 
labour market regulation can affect the equality in opportunities at 
the moment of the entrance into the labour market itself. The 
working conditions and wage regulation become less related to effort 
and personal abilities and more related to characteristics of the job. 
Hence, institutional rigidities tend to maintain dual labour markets, 
between more and less guaranteed jobs, and produce negative effects 
on income distribution via inequality in wage premium to sectors (for 
example, with more or less union density), to careers (with implicit 
forms of discriminations by gender, age, profession status and social 
background), to difference in unemployment benefits coverage and 
duration (related to the size of the firms, to the duration of the 
previous labour contract or to be employed in the public sector). 
The empirical results on the impact of labour institutions on income 
inequalities are not always satisfactory and they are quite 
heterogeneous since dataset of good quality on institutions and 
national labour market regulation proxies are not available, even for 
developed countries and for a sufficient numbers of observations. 
One recognized common reason is that the total effects on income 
distribution could be ambiguous if the negative impact of labour 
institutions on unemployment levels is taken into account (Blanchard 
and Wolfers, 2000). A higher rate of unemployment, often a 
consequence of regulations, will increase the fraction of individual 
with lower incomes and hence raise inequalities. It is opportune to 
compare the positive effect of labour institutions on inequality, via 
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wage dispersion reduction, with the negative effect related to the 
increase of the rate of unemployment. Furthermore, each instrument 
of labour regulation can produce on unemployment and/or wage 
dispersion aneffect that can be different in sign and magnitude.Thus, 
the general impact on income distribution can be ambiguous. 
Given these shortcomings, we prefer to consider a proxy of labour 
institutions that can provide a general measure of various aspects of 
the regulatory framework of national labour markets in Europe, 
instead of considering particular labour market institutions 
separately. To take into account the presence of institutions aimed to 
remove barriers in the labour market entrance and to promote the 
equality in working conditions and regulations, we introduce a 
measure of labour freedom that is calculated by the Heritage 
Foundation as part of the more general Index of Economic Freedom 
(Heritage, 2011)13. 
A higher degree of labour freedom is expected to produce a more 
equal distribution of income in the EU. This can counterbalance the 
effect of social mobility on inequality, on one side, but it can 
represent, on the other, a more opportune measure of political and 
economic freedoms with respect to countries that certainly can be 
defined equally democratic. The presence of democratic institutions, 
as a determinant of inequality, is common in the literature but seems 
more relevant to explain cross-country differences between less 
developed and more advanced countries (for example, Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996) than across Europe.  
 
1.4.3. Intergenerational mobility and wealth transmission 
 
Within non-industrialized societies, family of origin and direct 
inheritance determine social status, occupational destinations and 
future professional roles. Direct family transmission of social 
                                                 
13 “The labour freedom component is a quantitative measure that looks into various 
aspects of the legal and regulatory framework of a country’s labour market. It 
provides cross-country data on regulations concerning minimum wages; laws 
inhibiting layoffs; severance requirements; and measurable regulatory burdens on 
hiring, hours, and so on” (Source: The Heritage Foundation). 
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advantages may still play a significant role in developed economies; 
but indirect family transmission (mainly through cultural, relational 
and financial credit support) is likely to be more effective to 
guarantee good opportunities and higher standard of living to future 
generations.       
A significant aspect of intergenerational mobility is related to the 
mechanisms of transfer of wealth between successive generations. 
The difficulties in identifying and evaluating assets,which may not 
have a clearly defined price, make the estimates including wealth 
less robust. Therefore, inequality in the wealth distribution is not 
introduced explicitly in international comparison of standard of 
living. But this does not mean that the effects of wealth on income 
distribution are unimportant as a determinant of inequality. For 
instance, it is plausible to believe that younger generations are likely 
to have accumulated less wealth than the older ones.  
Sincestatistics of good quality to take account of the effects of wealth 
on income inequality do not exist, some indication of the potential 
partial effect can be given by the information about housing tenure.In 
fact, home ownership is a widespread component of wealth in the 
population of many countries and it can vary widely across Europe, 
since the choice to live in a house as owner is strongly related to 
institutions and cultural traditions, which are proper of each country. 
The standard analyses based on monetary disposable income take 
into account household wealth only through cash property incomes 
received by landlords and through interests, rents and dividends on 
other owned financial assets. In the last decade, the literature 
(Smeeding and Weinberg, 2001) and the institutional reports (for 
example, Canberra Group, 2001) strongly support the inclusion of 
the impact of the housing component of wealth in disposable income 
even for owner-occupiers, especially for international comparison. 
Home ownership yields value to the owner both as an asset (the 
house can be sold in difficult times, likely with a monetary gain, or it 
can be a collateral value to acquire credit for housing and non-
housing consumption) and as a flow via imputed rent (the house can 
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produce a flow of services at below-market price)14. Even if there are 
great differences in the empirical results, which depend mainly on 
the different estimation methods employed to evaluate imputed rents, 
the inclusion of this value in household disposable incomes produce 
a reduction of inequalities, a raise in mean incomes and a reduction 
in the poverty risk rates across European countries.   
Moreover, it is important to consider the share of not outright owner-
occupiers across Europe, since housing loans constitute the largest 
liability of households. In each country, we expect that the share of 
outright owner-occupiers could be more related to structural 
determinants, while the share of family with mortgage could be 
better explained by market conditions, especially credit rationing for 
households without financial assets or collaterals. Among the 
structural factors, besides demographic effects, we can mention 
cultural determinants (i.e., the age of independence of young people 
from parents), social determinants (i.e., intergenerational transfers of 
wealth as bequests or heritages), and institutional determinants (i.e., 
the previous communist regime could mean an above average share 
of ownership for many new entrants in the EU). Statistics on tenure 
characteristics at EU level show that on average over the 70% of 
households live in a house as owner, but this value can be more than 
90% in many of the new entrants; on the contrary, Germany has a 
share close to 50% and other countries just above 60% (for example, 
Scandinavian and central Europe countries). The differences are even 
more considerable in the share of families on mortgage: the value is 
very low for Eastern and Mediterranean countries (less than 10%) 
while, in many Scandinavian and Central Europe countries, the 
percentage of households with a loan is  about half of the owner-
occupiers. Furthermore, there may be tenants that are not paying 
market rents, since they live in rent-subsidized housing by public 
institution (including social housing) or by private landlords (family, 
                                                 
14 Imputed rents can be seen as a proxy of housing wealth effects on income 
distribution, but their inclusion in the definition of disposable income has become 
common in the European statistics only since 2007. For this reason, they are not 
included in our data set. 
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friends, employer) and, occasionally, rent-free. Therefore, even the 
share of private market (non-subsidized) rents can have an important 
between-countries variability that depends on family backgrounds, 
on welfare state regimes for public-subsidized housing, and on 
personal relationships in the case of private-subsidized housing. 
Globally, owners are better off than tenants and, in many countries, 
families on mortgage are better off than outright owners. These 
differences are explained by the fact that normally older households 
are more likely to be outright owner-occupiers (and frequently worse 
off than people still working) and, on the other side, loan markets are 
less rationedfor wealthy households. A recent study on housing 
finance by ECB (2009) shows that in many European countries the 
shares of households with mortgages are concentrated in the upper 
two quartiles of income distribution and in the working age of the 
household heads (35-54 years old),though few exceptions can be 
observed. For the period covered by the ECB report, the shares of 
younger and not wealthy households (in the bottom quartile) that are 
paying loans for the house purchase are above average in Northern 
countries (in the Netherlands, these are the more relevant ones).  
There are not many other contributions in literature about the impact 
of housing tenure on income distribution, but the ECB analysis 
seems to reinforce the relevance of household indebtedness 
expressed by changes in the share of families on loan for the period 
(1995-2010) we are considering in our model. Household debt for 
house purchases, expressed as a percentage of GDP, has increased in 
the euro area from 27% in 1999 to 42% in 2007 (the average growth 
was around 10%) and doubled from 12% at the end of 2004 to 23% 
by end of 2007, in the non-euro EU new members of Central and 
Eastern Europe. Various factors can explain, in the ECB evaluation, 
the strong growth of housing loans: mainly, lower interest rates, 
income and population growth, liberalization and better competition 
in the mortgage market (given the opening to foreign banks) have led 
to the introduction of new products and facilitated longer maturities 
of loan supply and more flexibility in repayments schedules. The 
increased per capita indebtedness in the euro area as a whole was 
less dispersed among countries in 2007, when compared with 1999, 
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reflecting the catching-up of countries with less-indebted households 
and, probably, a different rise in housing prices. But the degree of 
dispersion is still important if we consider, besides the euro area, also 
the non-euro countries and the new EU members (as we do in our 
model). 
In conclusion, the few contributions, on one side, show that we 
would have plausible relationships between housing tenure and 
income inequality via inequalities of opportunities and, on the other, 
underline the particular relevance of intergenerational mobility and 
family background in explaining home ownership variability 
between EU countries. In the last decades, the increasing share of 
families on loan can mitigate such effects and in this sense it could 
have a positive effect in reducing inequalities created by wealth 
transmission. Therefore, in our model, we introduce the share of 
owners on mortgage as proxy of intergenerational mobility, which is 
expected to have a negative impact on income inequality, given the 
strong link of this variable with credit market conditions that can 
balance other structural, cultural, relational and social determinants 
of housing tenure in Europe. 
 
2. The model 
 
Our work studies the impact of the dimensions previously outlined 
on the dynamics of income inequality for twenty-five EU’s 
members: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United 
Kingdom15. All of them are studied over the 1995-2010 period in 
order to track the evolution of their income distribution from the 
beginning16 to date. In fact, 1995 and 2010 are respectively the first 
and thelast years of available evidence.  
                                                 
15 Malta and Cyprus are excluded from the dataset due to missing statistics for 
several variables.  
16 The EU was created by the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force on 
November 1, 1993. 
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By considering this set of countries, which constitutes a homogenous 
sample belonging to (at least formally) the same institutional 
framework, our work introduces different departures from the 
previous literature. First, the European countries are never analysed 
altogether but typically just a subset of them is studied as 
“representative” of the category of the developed countries. Second, 
the analyses of income inequalities are predominantly cross-
sectional. This allows capturing the differences among the units 
considered, but avoids following each unit and explaining the 
dynamics over time (Frees, 2004). Third, our theoretical framework 
defines a new formal empirical strategy for the comprehension of the 
forces that shape the evolution of household disposable income 
inequality. In this perspective, new structural determinants, related to 
household changes (instead of demographic evolution) and 
intergenerational wealth transmission, and original proxies for labour 
market institutions and social mobility are considered. 
 
2.1. Dependent Variables 
 
To assess income inequality, following the literature, we use four 
different measures17: the Gini coefficient, and the ninth to first, ninth 
to fifth, fifth to firstdeciles ratios18. The first, the Gini Index, which 
measures the extent to which the distribution of income among 
individuals or households within an economy deviates from a 
perfectly equal distribution, is known to assign more weight to the 
centre of the frequency distribution. Due to this, other indicators are 
considered. In fact, the deciles ratios allow respectively to study the 
relation between the top and the bottom (P90/P10), the top and the 
medium (P90/P50), the medium and the bottom percentiles 
                                                 
17 Our data comes from the Eurostat Database, in particular the EU-SILC statistics, 
which aim at collecting homogenous cross-sectional and longitudinal data. Although 
these figures are often criticized due to comparability issues especially for earlier 
years, we make use of them as they constitute the only available evidence to conduct 
this kind of analysis. 
18 Gini coefficients and deciles are not available for every year. 
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(P50/P10) of the income distribution19. All these measures constitute 
the dependent variables of our model, since there is evidence that 
they may give different countries rankings (Figure 1 and 2) and each 
of them could eventually highlightspecific factors better explaining 
income dispersion. Moreover, the determinants of inequality are not 
necessarily the same when income inequality is measured by the Gini 
Index or by indicators related to the tails of the distribution. For this 
reason, we like testing the impact of the supposed forces depending 
on the measure used.  
But before proceeding with the description and the study of the 
supposed determinants (regressors), it is worthwhile to understand 
the state of inequality in Europe. To this end, we firstly perform a 
comparative exercise (Figure 1 and Figure 2) and then provide some 
descriptive statistics (Table 1).  
The comparative exercise considers the average of the four measures 
employed over the defined sample. A deeper investigation reveals 
that there exists a significant difference among the EU countries and 
it becomes interesting to check whether the classification of the 
countries that appear as less or more unequal, according to each of 
these indicators, is coherent on the whole. Therefore, it is worth to 
verify whether, in general, our model is consistent with the chosen 
measures of income inequality and, in particular, the impact in each 
case of the original regressors (household structure, housing 
ownership, labour freedom, education (im)mobility) we have 
definedas proxies of the forces explaining inequality. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
19 They are calculated as the ratio of the ninth to first, ninth to fifth, fifth to first 
deciles, considering the top cut off point, as income and living conditions indicator, 
expressed in purchasing power standard.  
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Figure 1 - Average of Gini Index for the EU 25 countries. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Average of the ninth to first deciles ratio for the 
EU 25 countries. 
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Figure 3 - Average of Gini Index for the EU 25 countries 
over different time periods. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Distribution of income by fifth to first and ninth to 
fifth (average) deciles ratio. 
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Considering the Gini Index (average values), the less unequal 
countries are Slovenia, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Czech 
Republic; the more unequal are Lithuania, Greece, Estonia, Latvia, 
Portugal (Figure 1). According to the ninth to first deciles ratio 
(again in average terms) the less unequal are Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland, Czech Republic and Slovenia; the more unequal, Estonia, 
Latvia, Portugal, Lithuania, and Romania (Figure 2). With respect to 
both measures, it can be noticed that the countries arrangement is 
quite similar and, as theoretically expected, the Scandinavian 
countries belong to the less unequal group, some Mediterranean ones 
to the more unfair, while recent EU members can be found in both 
groups. 
Concerning the evolution of income inequality over time (Figure 
3)20, it is worth observing that Denmark, Finland, Bulgaria, 
Germany, Romania and Lithuania have known an increase of income 
inequality since 2004, whereas Slovakia, Belgium, Ireland, Spain and 
Estonia a downturn of it. Our analyses broadly support the same 
results of the empirical literature: a relative increase in inequality can 
be observedin the recent years mainly for the Scandinavian countries, 
which anyhow continue to be the less unequal, and for many of the 
new members (in particular, income inequality has been relatively 
low for Bulgaria and Romania until 2003 and afterward it has rapidly 
grown). 
Finally, the last figure (Figure 4) adds information about the 
distribution of income disparity according to two differentmeasures, 
namely ninth to fifth and fifth to first deciles ratio21. In particular, 
comparing the two countries arrangements from the less unequal one, 
it has to be highlighted that Slovakia, Hungary, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
and Greece are characterized by less income disparity, when the 
higher part of the frequency distribution is considered (the ninthto 
fifth deciles ratio).This evidence meansthat inequalitymay be 
relatively higher for lower incomes even for countries with an 
                                                 
20 Countries are ranked from the less unequal, considering the average value of the 
Gini Index over the first period. 
21 Countries are ranked from the less unequal, on the basis of the average of the fifth 
to first deciles ratio. 
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averageGiniIndex well below the sample mean. Czech Republic, 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Estonia and Portugal are characterized by 
less inequality, when the lower part is taken into account.The Gini 
Index is relatively high for the last two countries, whereasthe 
distribution is not completely unfair for lower incomes.  
This investigation shows that the four indicators depict an exhaustive 
picture of the differences in terms of income disparity among the EU 
countries and the diverse classification they provide, although the 
dissimilarity is small, corroborates the strategy of using all the 
variables as dependent ones. In fact, this procedure allows to have a 
more complete description of the inequality distribution and to study 
the behaviour of the supposed explanatory dimensions, according to 
the section of the income distribution considered.Moreover, the 
descriptive statistics (Table 1) justify empirically the methodology 
employed: all the measures exhibit a between standard deviation 
considerably higher than the within one. This means that the 
difference in terms of inequality among these countries is greater 
than the longitudinal variation each of them has known, which 
however deserves attention and must be taken into account in order 
to give reliable results. That’s why the EU institutions have been 
placing a great value on economic and social cohesion policies for 
several years and emphasize the targets to raise the standard of living 
and the quality of life of all citizens throughout the Union for the 
present decade. 
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Table 1 - Dependent Variables. Descriptive Statistics. 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Gini Index     
 Overall 29.026 4.392 N =     400 
 Between  4.128 Countries = 25 
 Within  1.698 Time periods = 16 
     
Ninth/First     
 Overall 3.883 .987 N =     400 
 Between  .975 Countries = 25 
 Within  .247 Time periods = 16 
     
Ninth/Fifth     
 Overall 1.901 .227 N =     400 
 Between  .224 countries = 25 
 Within  .059 Time periods = 16 
     
Fifth/First     
 Overall 2.014 .293 N =     400 
 Between  .287 Countries = 25 
 Within  .081 Time periods = 16 
 
 
2.2. Independent Variables 
 
As explained theoretically, in our framework, the hypothesised 
determinants of inequality are the macroeconomic performance, the 
so called structural features (household structure and housing 
ownership), the redistributive policies (social public expenditure) and 
the institutional dimensions affecting social and intergenerational 
mobility (labour institutions, economic and educational parental 
background)22. 
To assess the countries’ macroeconomic performance, we rely on 
GDP per capita growth23, which is expected to have a negative 
impact on income inequality, due to earnings disparity related to the 
differences in terms of dynamics of productivity and/or educational 
                                                 
22 Although observations are not always available for every year, we employ these 
variables anyway as they allow to proxy new determinants and give a new insight 
about the causes of income inequality.   
23 Data Source: World Development Indicators Database. 
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achievements. The structural features basically pertain to the 
household structure (we consider families with dependent children) 
and the housing ownership by tenure status (we consider the “owner 
on loan” status)24. The household structure considers indirectly the 
demographic dimension (since dependent children are less present in 
older households) and implicitly the labour market involvement of 
parents in working age. As already discussed (section 2.2.2.), a 
couple can show a greater concentration of workers than a single 
parent, whereas the presence of dependent children can increase the 
probability to have a part-timer with respect to a household with two 
(or more) members in working age. The share of households with 
children, following this reasoning, is expected to affect income 
inequality either positively or negatively, since it may produce 
effects on labour market involvement in both directions. The housing 
ownership on loan25 can be a structural proxy of the access to the 
credit market and in this sense it is negatively related to income 
inequality; this regressor allows also to capture intergenerational 
mobility. The transfer of wealth between generations, as discussed in 
paragraph 2.4.3., can be a determinant of social (im)mobility and a 
factor increasing inequality; this effect of family background can be 
balanced by a greater openness of mortgage markets especially in the 
last decades. The government behaviour is supposed to affect 
negatively the evolution of income disparity and, in particular, we 
study the impact of the more general redistributive policies financing 
health care, educational and social protection systems26, as typical of 
the welfare regimes that characterize European countries. Finally, the 
institutional arrangements affecting the social and intergenerational 
mobility are proxied by the labour freedom indicator27, which 
assesses various aspects of the legal and regulatory framework of a 
country labour market and can off-set inequality of opportunities in 
entering top professional status;the housing ownership variable 
                                                 
24 Households with Dependent Children; Households by Tenure Status. Data Source: 
Eurostat, EU-SILC Statistics Database. 
25 Data Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC Statistics Database. 
26 Data Source: Eurostat, Government Finance Statistics. 
27 Data Source: The Heritage Foundation. 
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(already discussed) that accounts of the effects of intergenerational 
transmission of wealth;and the education (im)mobility effect, 
assessed by the interaction term between the tertiary school 
enrolment rate28 and the degree of correlation between persons of 
different age (25-34 and 55-69) with tertiary education attainment29, 
as the family education background is expected to favour inequality 
increase via unfair opportunities for younger generations (i.e. 
intergenerational transmission of education (social) opportunities). 
This variable not only quantifies the educational opportunities but 
implicitly allows controlling for the level of human capital in these 
countries. Labour freedom and housing ownership with loan are 
expected to have a negative impact, while educational (im)mobility a 
positive one. 
The following table (Table 2) provides the descriptive statistics for 
these variables. Except for GDP per capita growthfor which this 
evidence is totally expected since European countries tend to follow 
a common path, all the variables exhibit a between standard 
deviation greater than the within one. This is coherent with the 
evidence obtained for the dependent variables and confirms that the 
panel analysis is the best estimation strategy to exhaustively study 
the role played by the identified determinants ofincome distribution 
among the EU countries. 
 
Formally, the specification of our model is: 
 
ݕ௜,௧ = ܽ ൅ ܾݔ௜,௧ ൅ ܿz௜,௧ ൅ ݀Ԃ௜,௧ ൅ ݁ߞ௜,௧ ൅ ݂ߢ௜,௧ ൅ ݃Ι୧,୲ ൅ ߰௧ ൅ ߳௜,௧  (2) 
 
where ݅=1,...,25; ݐ=1995,...,2010; ݔ௜,௧ is the macroeconomic 
variable; z௜,௧ represents the redistributive policies; Ԃ௜,௧,ߞ௜,௧, ߢ௜,௧, the 
set of structural features; ߇௜,௧, the institutional arrangements; ߝ௜,௧ are 
the idiosyncratic errors; ߰௧ captures the time effects, which allow to 
eliminate the bias arising from unobserved variables that change over 
time. The dependent variable ݕ௜,௧ can alternatively be one of the 
                                                 
28 Data Source: World Development Indicators Database. 
29 Data Source: Eurostat, Educational Attainment Database. 
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measures of income inequality defined above (Gini Index, P90/P10, 
P90/P50, and P50/P10 deciles ratios). 
 
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics. Independent Variables. 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Gpd p.c. growth     
 Overall 2.695 3.839 N =     400 
 Between  1.381 Countries = 25 
 Within  3.592 Time periods = 16 
Social Public 
Expenditure     
 Overall 27.590 5.672 N =     400 
 Between  5.441 Countries = 25 
 Within  1.918 Time periods = 16 
Housing Owner Loan     
 Overall 23.743 18.050 N =     400 
 Between  18.307 countries = 25 
 Within  1.797 Time periods = 16 
HH dep children     
 Overall 55.360 5.916 N =     400 
 Between  5.509 Countries = 25 
 Within  2.406 Time periods = 16 
Educ(Im)mobility     
 Overall 46.507 16.339 N =     400 
 Between  13.060 Countries = 25 
 Within  10.139   Time periods = 16 
Labour Freedom     
 Overall 62.159 13.991 N =     400 
 Between  14.091 Countries = 25 
 Within  2.155 Time periods = 16 
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3. Econometric Results 
 
The particular structure of the dataset and preliminary tests, which 
indicate the presence of cross-sectional dependence30, 
heteroskedasticity and within panel AR(1) autocorrelation31, suggest 
to fit this linear panel-data model by feasible generalized least 
squares32 (Wooldridge, 2002).  
We start considering the Gini coefficient as dependent variable 
(Table 3). Our first regression (column I) provides the estimates of 
the model on the entire sample. All the variables are statistically 
significant and the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected sign. 
As theoretically explained, growth affects negatively the evolution of 
income distribution; the redistributive policies, namely the public 
commitment towards health, education and social protection33, have 
a negative impact. 
The housing ownership, catching on one hand the “material” parental 
background and on the other the chance people of different income 
levels have to access the credit market, may theoretically affect 
income inequality in both directions. Outright housing ownership,as 
proxy of low social mobility and strong family background 
relationships via intergenerational transfers, is positively related to 
income inequality. However, its impact is different when the tenure 
status is considered, and more specifically when the share of those 
                                                 
30 Frees, 1995; Pesaran, 2004; Sarafidis et al., 2006. 
31 Drukker, 2003; Im et al., 2003; Levin et al., 2002; Wooldridge, 2002. 
32 As said before (footnotes 19 and 23), in some cases, data are not available for 
every year. To complete the dataset, we therefore use simple moving average 
between available observations or the latest available one. As we can see (Tables 
A.1 and A.2, Appendix A) this procedure does not distort series, even those with the 
fewest observations (i.e. housing ownership and labour freedom), as both inequality 
measures and structural determinants are by their nature supposed to change slowly 
over brief time periods (like that covered by our analysis). 
33 The model has been estimated also considering the sole social protection 
expenditure and the results are confirmed for each dependent variable. However, we 
like showing the results when also the other components are included, as they all are 
universal services according to the welfare systems of the majority of EU countries.  
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who are paying a mortgage34 is observed. In this sense, the more 
open are mortgage market opportunities to all households, the lower 
should be income inequalities. And this precisely is what happens in 
our model. 
The household structure, which explains the demographic conditions 
and implicitly control for the involvement of the household in the 
labour market, affects positively income inequality. The shares of 
household with children, as introduced in paragraph 2.2.2 and 2.3, 
can be a proxy of different combined effects, which overall produce 
an increase of inequality in our model. Three are the effects that 
work in this direction: a greater probability to have two workers in 
the top income households; a greater share of part-timers in many 
countries, given the presence of mothers of young children; less 
generosity of public net benefits, with respect to other types of 
households and different age groups.  
The educational (im)mobility proxy plays a positive role for the 
dynamics of the Gini Index. In the mobility process, a crucial role is 
played by public investment in education, to remove liquidity 
constraints, and by more active policies towards social barriers. In 
fact, only both types of government interventions could allow lower 
background young people to attend higher education. Actually, also 
the process of transition from school to work should enter in the 
agenda of equal opportunity policies, since some education systems 
are more effective at achieving equality in the labour market 
entrance. Only the opportune combination of different types of 
policies, affecting also the labour market structure, can interrupt the 
negative chain of inequalities from a generation to the successive. 
To this regard, it is worth noting the negative sign of the labour 
freedom indicator, which confirms that the policies aimed at 
removing obstacles in entering the job markets and increasing social 
fluidity can create a more equal distribution of income. As discussed 
before (paragraph 2.4.2), among EU countries, the impact of labour 
market institutions on income inequality is ambiguous since labour 
                                                 
34 Personal parents’ guarantees are frequently used in some Mediterranean countries 
to allow younger households to obtain a loan for housing purchase.  
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regulation may have either a positive effect on wage dispersion or a 
negative one, due to a likely increasing of the rate of unemployment. 
The variable used as general indicator for this determinant maintains 
sign and significance through different specifications, confirming its 
cumulative effect of reducing income inequality. 
The last columns (II-IV) show the estimates of the model on 
different parts of the sample. All the regressors are highly 
statistically significant, behave as expected, and this coherence 
confirms the stability of the specified model. Moreover, the estimates 
prove the relevance of our original proxies: a more general definition 
of social public expenditure, the inclusion of family structure, 
intergenerational and social mobility, and labour market institutions. 
Looking at the estimated coefficients, it is worthwhile to say a few 
words about the government expenditure, the housing ownership and 
the household structure variables. As we can see, the estimated 
impact of the government expenditure for the Euro participants and 
the Western countries is greater than the one estimated for the entire 
and the North countries samples. This happens because the Euro 
participants and the Western (old members35) countries have, on 
average, a higher public expenditure (29% and 30%, respectively) 
than the whole sample (27%) and that of North countries (28%), 
among which there are economies with lower income inequality, 
where a reduced redistributive effectbetween demographic groups 
and different welfare functions is required. In particular, it is worth 
to remember that the Scandinavian countries are characterized on 
one hand by generous welfare regimes that supply universal public 
services of good quality and on the other by a strongly progressive 
taxation. Thus, a more equal income distribution is the outcome of 
the balance between taxes and benefits.With regard to the housing 
ownership (with loan), the estimated coefficient over the sample of 
Western countries is greater than the other cases. This is due to the 
fact that the countries with a communist tradition, which present the 
                                                 
35 As the new EU members are just ten, we infer results from the sample of the “old 
members”. 
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lowest shares, have been excluded36. Finally, it can be noticed that 
the estimated impact of the households with dependent children 
variable is a little bit lower over the three sub-samples: the reason is 
the persistence among them of countries with low birth rates, high 
population aging and a reduced participation of women in the labour 
market37. 
 
                                                 
36 On average over the 1995-2010 period, Bulgaria 4.68%; Czech Republic 12.45%; 
Estonia 14.5%; Hungary 15.88%; Latvia, 6.8%; Lithuania 6.28%; Poland  4.95%; 
Romania 0.825%; Slovakia 5.56%; Slovenia 4.7%. The overall sample mean is 26%. 
37 Concerning the women participation, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia, Spain exhibit, over the 1995-2010 period, an 
average rate lower than the sample one (62.45%). Regarding people aging 
(population ages 65 and above), over the same time period, Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom present 
an average percentage greater than that of the entire sample (15.37%). Concerning 
birth rates over the 1995-2010 period, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain display 
an average fertility rate (births per woman) minor than the sample mean (1.49%). 
(Source: World Development Indicators). 
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Table 3 - GLS Regressions. General Model and  
Different Sub-Samples. 
Dependent variable: Gini Index 
Estimation method: GLS regressions 
 I II III IV 
 All 
countries 
North  
Countries1 
Euro 
participants2 
Western 
Countries3 
Gdp pc growth -.0369*** 
(.0127) 
-.0768*** 
(.0027) 
-.0544*** 
(.0088) 
-.0738*** 
(.0173) 
Social Public 
Expenditure 
-.2713***  
 (.0265) 
-.2986*** 
(.0066) 
-.4050*** 
(.0124) 
-.4591*** 
(.0167) 
Housingownerloan -.0979***   
(.0125) 
-.0704*** 
(.0049) 
-.0671*** 
(.0126) 
-.1190*** 
(.0067) 
Hhdepchildren .1168***   
(.0203) 
.0899*** 
(.0056) 
.0429*** 
(.0130) 
.0889*** 
(.0207) 
Educ (Im)mobility .0559***   
(.0099) 
.0735*** 
(.0026) 
.0477***  
(.0035) 
.0243*** 
(.0046) 
Labourfreedom -.0843*** 
(.0174)
-.0257*** 
(.0033)
-.0289*** 
(.0098)
-.0254*** 
(.0066)
constant .3654*** 
(.0166)
.3355*** 
(.0039)
.4054*** 
(.0088)
.4399*** 
(.0133) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes 
N 400 240 224 240 
Wald test 
Chi2(21) 
483.77 
p-val=0.00 
6411.53 
p-val=0.00 
7338.41 
p-val=0.00 
295611.87 
p-val=0.00 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Standard errors are 
reported in brackets. 
1: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
2: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain.Estonia entered in the Euro area in 2011. It is 
not included as our sample covers the 1995-2010 period. 
3: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
 
 
We proceed the analysis estimating our general model with the four 
defined measures of income inequality. The importance of this 
strategy is two-fold. It allows on one hand to check the empirical 
stability of the model and the coherence of the main findings (Table 
4) through different specifications, on the other, to understand 
whether the supposed determinants affect differently the evolution of 
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income, according to the dimension considered. On the whole, 
except for the macroeconomic control, whose estimated coefficient is 
not significant when the highest part of the income distribution is 
taken into account(as in literature, the earning dispersion related to 
technological changes and employment dynamics for the top of the 
distribution are relatively reduced), the other regressors behave as 
expected. It is worth noting that the public spending has a smaller 
impact on the ninth to fifth deciles ratio, meaning that the 
redistributive effects are,as expected, pro-poor; that owing a house 
with a granted loan has a greater effect on income inequality, 
whenever income inequality is measured over the poorest 
brackets,whichin particular are the most rationed in the credit 
market; that the household structure has a smaller impact on the fifth 
to first deciles ratio, which is due to the fact that in this pool there is 
the highest share of households with dependent children38 and a 
smaller probability to have two working parents, which in turn 
impacts negatively on (labour) income distribution. 
 
  
                                                 
38 Households with dependent children: on average, below 60% of median equalised 
income, the share is 57.10%; on average, above 60%, it is 53.15%. 
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Table 4 - GLS Regressions. Different measures of income inequality. 
 DependentVariable 
 I II III IV 
 Gini Index Ninth/First Ninth/Fifth Fifth/First 
Gdp pc growth -.0366*** 
(.0127) 
-.0468*** 
(.0126)
-.0009     
(.0036)
-.0260***   
(.0050)
Social Public 
Expenditure 
-.2713*** 
 (.0265736) 
-.1795*** 
(.0386) 
-.0873*** 
(.0107) 
-.1478***   
(.0128)
Housingownerloan -.0979*** 
(.0125) 
-.1955*** 
(.0124)
-.0197*** 
(.0053)
-.1054***   
(.0045)
HH depchildren .1168*** 
(.0203) 
.1062*** 
(.0297)
.0852*** 
(.0093)
.0404***   
(.0123)
Educ(Im)mobility .0559*** 
(.0099) 
.0240* 
(.0140) 
.0124** 
(.0055)
.0132***   
(.0042)
Labourfreedom -.0843*** 
(.0174) 
-.0691*** 
(.0234)
-.0417*** 
(.0048)
-.0419***   
(.0059)
constant .3654*** 
(.0166) 
.4582*** 
 (.0253) 
.1942*** 
(.0070) 
.2712*** 
 (.0080) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes 
N 400 400 400 400 
Wald test  
Chi2(21) 
483.77 
p-val=0.00 
880.23 
p-val=0.00 
641.14 
p-val=0.00 
4919.71 
p-val=0.00 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels.Standard errors are 
reported in brackets. 
 
 
Then, to evaluate the robustness of the model, we like studying what 
happens when the general specification is regressed over different 
sub-samples of countries, chosen on the basis of precise economic 
characteristics. 
We start considering (Tables 5 and 6) the sample of the lessunequal 
and more unequal countries.The sample called “less unequal 
countries” does not include those countries whose average Gini is 
equal to or greater than 33, namely United Kingdom, Lithuania, 
Greece, Estonia, Latvia and Portugal. Symmetrically, the sample 
called “more unequal countries” leaves out the six countries with an 
average Gini lower than 26. These are Slovenia, Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland, Czech Republic, and Austria39. More specifically, this 
                                                 
39 The overall average sample is 29. 
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sample partition40, according to the previous comparative analysis 
(Figure 1), excludes the extremes of the countries arrangement and 
includes in both cases (Tables 5 and 6) the countries being around ± 
10% of the sample mean41. 
 
Table 5 - GLS Regressions. Income inequality over the  
lessunequal1 countries. 
 Dependent Variable
 I II III IV 
 Gini Index Ninth/First Ninth/Fifth Fifth/First 
Gdp pc growth -.0604*** 
(.01118) 
-.0173** 
(.0083)
-.0026 
(.0025)
-.0097** 
(.0039)
Social Public 
Expenditure 
-.3055*** 
(.0202) 
-.3393*** 
(.0167) 
-.0696*** 
(.0066) 
-.1262*** 
(.0078)
Housingownerloan -.0160* 
(.0090) 
-.1864*** 
(.0127)
-.0106*** 
(.0032)
-.0789*** 
(.0040)
Hhdepchildren .0919*** 
(.0180) 
.1800*** 
(.0176)
.0545*** 
(.0070)
.0450*** 
(.0072)
Educ(Im)mobility .0345*** 
(.0043) 
.0463*** 
(.0096) 
-.0046    
(.0033)
.0293*** 
(.0031)
Labourfreedom -.0414*** 
(.0116) 
-.0543*** 
(.0170)
-.0143*** 
(.0036)
-.0157*** 
(.0018)
constant .3422***   
(.0134) 
.4286*** 
(.0183) 
.1878*** 
(.0048) 
.2268*** 
(.0064) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes 
N 304 304 304 304 
Wald test  
Chi2(21) 
1109.12 
p-val=0.00 
5541.99 
p-val=0.00 
4137.41 
p-val=0.00 
3519.70 
p-val=0.00 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Standard errors are 
reported in brackets. 
1: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden.  
 
 
                                                 
40 Our choice is econometrically guided by the need to keep a well-balanced relation 
between the number of years and the number of groups. In fact, since the time 
periods are sixteen, the model is no longer stable with less than nineteen countries. 
41 As some countries are present in either cases, to understand the prevailing effect 
we show the estimated regressions run over both samples.  
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Table 6 - GLS Regressions. Income inequality over the more 
unequal1countries. 
 DependentVariable 
 I II III IV 
 Gini Index Ninth/First Ninth/Fifth Fifth/First 
Gdp pc growth -.0352*** 
(.0059) 
-.0594*** 
(.0128) 
.0021    
(.0044)
-.0364*** 
(.0052)
Social Public 
Expenditure 
-.1310*** 
(.0237) 
-.2685*** 
(.0319) 
.0087    
(.0144) 
-.1931*** 
(.0084)
Housingownerloan -.0235*** 
(.0053) 
-.2467*** 
(.0099) 
-.0368*** 
(.0036)
-.0784*** 
(.0034)
Hhdepchildren .0920*** 
(.0123) 
.1887*** 
(.0314) 
.0389*** 
(.0107)
.0724*** 
(.0048)
Educ(Im)mobility .1158*** 
(.0060) 
.0873*** 
(.0151) 
.0117*** 
(.0038)
.0410*** 
(.0023)
Labourfreedom -.1136*** 
(.0148) 
-.2339*** 
(.0218) 
-.0587*** 
(.0069)
-.0515*** 
(.0029)
constant .3096*** 
(.0110) 
.5319*** 
(.0284) 
.2083*** 
(.0088) 
.2503*** 
(.0046) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes 
N 304 304 304 304 
Wald test 
chi2(21) 
2771.53 
p-val=0.00 
95263.72 
p-val=0.00 
3678.75 
p-val=0.00 
18297.02 
p-val=0.00 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Standard errors are 
reported in brackets. 
1: Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, United 
Kingdom. 
 
 
As far as the public expenditure is concerned, among the 
“lessunequal” countries, the estimated impact is greater when the 
Gini coefficient and the ninth to first deciles ratio are the dependent 
variables. These countries, on average, spend more on social services 
in an universalistic perspective and tax more progressively. Thus, 
considering the centre and the extremes of the frequency distribution, 
these coefficients constitute a sort of “measure” of the effectiveness 
of the public intervention. Among the “more unequal” countries, the 
redistributive policies are not significant when the dependent 
variable is the ninth to fifth deciles ratio (Table 6, III column). As 
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this variable considers the “richest” people, it is clear that where 
inequality is higher, redistribution is less effective associal policies 
are mainly directed to the poorest.Owing the house with a granted 
loan, with respect to the estimates obtained over the entire sample, 
has a bigger effect among the “more unequal” countries when the top 
and the bottom of the income distribution are studied (Table 6, II 
column). It has a smaller impact (Table 5, I III and IV columns) 
overthe “lessunequal” ones,asthe obstacles created by the social 
immobility may predominantly be less relevant and the equality of 
opportunities more realized for all the society. As for the household 
structure, since the share of people in households with dependent 
children is greater on average among the poorest, an increase of this 
variable will raise inequality in these groups of people. This effect 
becomes more evident when the relation between the ninth and the 
first deciles is considered (Table 5 and Table 6, II columns). 
In the case of intergenerational education mobility, higher 
coefficients can be observed in the sub-sample of the “more unequal” 
countries. In fact, the evidence suggests that over the countries 
labelled as “less unequal” (Table 5),there may existmore 
mechanisms able to encourage the access to tertiary education, 
regardless of the family background: the non-significance of its 
estimated coefficient in the case of the ninth to fifth deciles ratio 
corroborates this insight (Table 5, III column).The last regressor, the 
labour freedom indicator, has a bigger impact on the various 
measures of income disparity among the “more unequal” countries, 
as greater freedom means lower inequality. As in literature, labour 
market institutions can reduce the impact of social and family 
background on professional status. 
To conclude, our quantitative analysis takes into account other two 
partitions of the sample: the first formed by countries with a low 
social public expenditure (Table 7) and the second formed by the 
high growing countries (Table 8). More specifically, starting from 
the former, it is worth noting that even though we are considering the 
low spending countries, the government commitment has a greater 
impact on the ninth to first deciles ratio anyway. This highlights that 
the redistributive policies have in general a greater impact on the 
55 
 
tails of the distribution than on the whole population. If we keep on 
looking at this part of the income distribution, we can also notice that 
the housing variable has a bigger effect: as there are fewer 
government transfers, families will not buy the house, given the 
reduced social fluidityin the wealth transmission. On the same 
measure of income inequality, also the estimated coefficient of the 
labour freedom indicator has a bigger effect, because a freedom 
increase is supposed to primarily reduce the gap between the rich and 
the poor in labour participation. 
 
Table 7 - GLS Regressions. Income inequality among the less 
spending countries. 
 Low Public Expenditure Countries1 
 Dependent Variable
 I II III IV 
 Gini Index Ninth/First Ninth/Fifth Fifth/First 
Gdp pc growth -.0372*** 
(.0120) 
-.0707*** 
(.0132) 
.0024    
(.0067)
-.0435*** 
(.0078)
Social Public 
Expenditure 
-.1129*** 
(.0296) 
-.1524*** 
(.0335) 
-.0553*** 
(.0144) 
-.1116*** 
(.0151)
Housingownerloan -.1042*** 
(.0129) 
-.3303*** 
(.0079) 
-.0266*** 
(.0039)
-.0639*** 
(.0050)
Hhdepchildren .0949*** 
(.0162) 
.0928*** 
(.0258) 
.0946*** 
(.0111)
.0493*** 
(.0086)
Educ(Im)mobility .0546*** 
(.0069) 
.0401*** 
(.0098) 
.0247*** 
(.0032)
.0213*** 
(.0055)
Labourfreedom -.0933*** 
(.0127) 
-.1887*** 
(.0166) 
-.0462*** 
(.0063)
-.0121* 
(.0069)
constant .3387***    
(.0139) 
.5693*** 
(.0174) 
.1774*** 
(.0083) 
.2203*** 
(.0081) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes 
N 320 320 320 320 
Wald test 
Chi2(21) 
1176.30 
p-val=0.00 
3259.48 
p-val=0.00 
928.62 
p-val=0.00 
1297.92 
p-val=0.00 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels.Standard errors are 
reported in brackets. 
5: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, United Kingdom.  
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For the last sub-sample of countries, the main findings are confirmed 
and, in the case of the more dynamic economies (Table 8), growth 
presents a small negative impact even on the richest tail of the 
distribution. In addition, if we look at the government expenditure, at 
the housing variable,at labour freedom and at educational 
(im)mobility, we can see that the estimated impact is lower on the 
ninth to fifth and on the fifth to first deciles ratios and more relevant 
on the ninth to first. The chosen determinants seem to produce 
bigger,positive or negative, effects on the tails of income 
distribution, particularly in the countries with higher development. 
The estimated effect of the households with dependent children 
variable is stronger on both the ninth to first and the fifth to first 
deciles ratios; this happens because it is in the poorest tails that the 
cumulated phenomena caught by this variable are more concentrated. 
For all the indicators, among the more dynamic EU countries, the 
bigger impact (with the respective expected sign) can be found when 
the poorest groups are considered. 
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Table 8 - GLS Regressions. Income inequality among high  
growing countries. 
 High Growth Countries1 
 DependentVariable
 I II III IV 
 Gini Index Ninth/First Ninth/Fifth Fifth/First 
Gdp pc growth -.0358*** 
(.0079) 
-.0415*** 
(.0064) 
-.0023* 
(.0013)
-.0257*** 
(.0005)
Social Public 
Expenditure 
-.2230*** 
(.0195) 
-.2256*** 
(.0154) 
-.0710*** 
(.0035) 
-.0197*** 
(.0019)
Housingownerloan -.0348*** 
(.0062) 
-.2928*** 
(.0049) 
-.0401*** 
(.0010)
-.0361*** 
(.0011)
Hhdepchildren .0928*** 
(.0174) 
.1788*** 
(.0155) 
.0392*** 
(.0028)
.2282*** 
(.0035)
Educ(Im)mobility  .0179*** 
(.0056) 
.0388*** 
(.0052) 
.0035***  
(.0010)
.0428*** 
(.0006)
Labourfreedom -.0488*** 
(.0068) 
-.1078*** 
(.0094) 
-.0462*** 
(.0016)
-.0574*** 
(.0010)
constant .3262***    
(.0107) 
.4693*** 
(.0095) 
.2231*** 
(.0019) 
.1102*** 
(.0016) 
Time Dummies yes yes yes yes 
N 256 256 256 256 
Wald test 
Chi2(21) 
10187.36 
p-val=0.00 
11072.58 
p-val=0.00 
38491.56 
p-val=0.00 
42165.86 
p-val=0.00 
Superscripts */**/*** denote 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels. Standard errors are 
reported in brackets. 
6: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden.  
 
 
On the whole, our estimation strategy testifies the stability of the 
model, and the coherence of the signs and the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients, according to the various specifications, 
confirms the validity of our results. By means of several original 
proxies, our findings allow to understand the forces shaping the 
evolution of household disposable income inequalities in a 
“homogeneous” sample of countriesand may indicate the direction of 
the appropriatepolicy measures able to control the extent of this 
phenomenon,which is a declared target for an effective cohesion of 
all the citizens in the European Union. 
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4. Conclusion and policy implications  
 
Focusingon the definition of household disposable income, our paper 
studies the course of income inequality among twenty-five EU 
members during the 1995-2010 period. These countries constitute, at 
least theoretically, a “homogenous” sample belonging to a general 
institutional framework, which aims for an effective and organic 
cohesion of all its associates, and at the same time offer the 
opportunity to develop a theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
forces that affect income disparity among developed economies. Our 
work identifies a wide set of determinants of income inequality, 
namely, government commitment, macroeconomic, institutional, 
cultural and social factors, and defines original proxies to assess the 
impact of public and market institutions, household structure and 
intergenerational (im)mobility.  
To gain a thorough picture of income dispersion, we consider 
different measures of income inequality and check our hypotheses 
running regressions over different sub-samples.Considering the Gini 
Index, over the general sample, all the (independent) variables are 
statistically significant and the estimated coefficients exhibit the 
expected sign. Growth affects negatively the evolution of income 
distribution; the public commitment towards health, education and 
social protection has a negative impact; the housing ownership by 
tenure status, the “on loan status”, has a negative effect, due to the 
advantages deriving from the mortgage market opportunities; the 
share of households with children, capturing several combined 
effects, affects positively income inequality; the educational 
(im)mobility variable has a positive effect, because of the social 
barriers and the consequent obstacles of the mobility process; the 
labour freedom indicator, a negative one, which confirms the crucial 
importance of reducing the hindrances and rigidities of the labour 
market.These results are also confirmed when the model is estimated 
over different sub-groups of EU members. The differences (with 
respect to the general case) stem from the peculiarities of the units 
involved, namely the nature of the welfare state regimes, cultural and 
demographic issues. 
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Then, we study what happens when other measures (ninth to first, 
ninth to fifth, fifth to first deciles ratios) of income disparity are used. 
It is interesting to note that all but the macroeconomic control behave 
as expected; that the government commitment exhibit a lower impact 
whenever the richest segments of the population are considered; that 
for the poorest brackets, owing a house with a loan means a lot, as 
these people are the most rationed in the credit market; that the 
household structure matter less when the lower segments are taken 
into account, since the highest share of dependent children is among 
this pool. 
More specifically, housing ownership with a granted loan count more 
among the more unequal countries, when the top and the bottom of 
the income distribution are observed, while it has a smaller impact 
among the more equal ones, where it can be assumed there is 
“more”equality of opportunity. Both among the more and the less 
unequal countries, an increase of the share of households with 
dependent children has a bigger effect when the extremes of the 
distribution are studied. Among the set of the more unequal EU 
members, both the intergenerational (im)mobility and labour 
freedom indicators display a bigger impact on the various measures 
of income disparity. 
Focusing on the low spending countries and on the tails of the 
distribution, it has to be highlighted the higher effect of the housing 
and labour freedom variables. For the former, this evidence stresses 
the social role of wealth transmission; for the second, the importance 
of the gap between the rich and the poor in the labour participation. 
Finally, in the case of the higher growth countries, all the regressors 
present bigger effects on the tails of income distribution, highlighting 
the importance of controlling the distance between rich and poor 
households in the development process. 
On the whole, our analysis confirms the importance and shows the 
role played by the different causes of income inequality,conceived 
specifically for the EU sample. Everyone agree that inequality is a 
challenging issue and, especially for the developed countries, its 
importance has become nowadays more dramatic. Hence, a first, 
general, conclusion is the warning about the need to watch out and 
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tackle income disparity, whose origins are numerous and whose 
effects dangerous and pervasive. But more specifically, some policy 
indications stand out. 
First. It is shown that growth affects negatively income inequality, 
via individual earnings dispersion between sectors of the economy. 
This suggests that both the measures that boost growth and thosethat 
mitigate the productivity differences and produce efficient 
employment adjustments may concretely hamper inequality. 
Second. Inequality can be attacked by the social spending. This, as 
our theoretical analysis explains, is a crucial tool to struggle 
inequality: itmust be targeted at the less advantaged and more 
effective at fostering class mobility. To this end, the policy makers 
should get rid of all the distortions between demographic groupsand 
among welfare functions that affect redistributionand define a fairer 
and real progressive system in balancing benefits and taxation 
burdens. 
Third. Inequality can be also combated by rebalancing the access to 
the credit market. It is shown that housing ownership “bother” 
inequality when the on loan status is considered. More generally, 
thismeans that a more open, in the sense of more equitable, credit 
market, where projects are rationed not only on the basis of the 
people means but on their effective economic appeal, is a condition 
to remove income concentration and related distortions created by 
social immobility. 
Fourth. The presence of dependent children in a household is another 
source of income disparity. To this regard, a policy prescriptionis to 
remove the barriers that prevent parentsfrom participatingin the 
labour market according to their effective expertise,with more 
accessible childhood structures, more extensive conciliation 
strategies and redistributive policies in behalf of needy and young 
households. 
Fifth. Efforts to achieve equality of opportunity should be high on 
the policy makers’ agenda. The governments should seriously make 
the commitment to allow lower background young people to attend 
higher education and attain the level they “can”, regardless of the 
liquidity constraints and social barriers they face. This requires a 
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focused public investment in education and active policies able to 
reduce the negative intergenerational effects and encourage the 
access to tertiary education, no matter the education level and the job 
of the previous generation.  
Sixth. The characteristics of the labour market cause the rise of 
inequality: entrance barriers and labour market regulation are 
recognized to affect equality of opportunities. Hence, policies 
promoting “equal” working conditions and regulations related to the 
worker efforts and abilities, and reducing the distance between more 
and less guaranteed jobs, can effectively interrupt the chain of 
inequality deriving from wage premium, different forms of 
discrimination and unemployment benefits favouring particular 
workers or sectors of the economy. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Table A.1 - Descriptive Statistics. Dependent Variables.  
“Unbalanced” series. 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Gini Index     
 Overall 29.232 4.319   N =     294 
 Between  4.200   Countries = 25 
 Within  1.723   Average Time periods = 11.76 
     
Ninth/First     
 Overall 3.775 .862   N =     246 
 Between  .947   Countries = 25 
 Within  .227   Average Time periods = 9.84 
     
Ninth/Fifth     
 Overall 1.887   .207   N =     246 
 Between  .215   countries = 25 
 Within  .060   AverageTime periods = 9.84 
     
Fifth/First     
 Overall 1.978   .253 N =     246 
 Between  .282  Countries = 25 
 Within  .081   Average Time periods = 9.84 
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Table A.2 - Descriptive Statistics. Independent Variables.  
“Unbalanced” series. 
Variables  Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Gpd p.c. growth     
 Overall 2.695   3.839  N =     400 
 Between  1.381   Countries = 25 
 Within  3.592 Time periods = 16 
Social Public 
Expenditure     
 Overall 27.530   5.748   N =     359 
 Between  5.498   Countries = 25 
 Within  1.746   Time periods = 14.36 
HousingOwnerLoan     
 Overall 25.880   18.266   N =     136 
 Between  17.902   countries = 25 
 Within  2.327 AverageTime periods = 5.44 
HH depchildren     
 Overall 54.624   5.659 N =     288 
 Between  5.208 Countries = 25 
 Within  2.664   AverageTime periods = 11.52 
Educ(Im)mobility     
 Overall 46.407   15.761   N =     349 
 Between  12.866   Countries = 25 
 Within  10.160   AverageTime periods = 13.96 
LabourFreedom     
 Overall 62.112   14.187   N =     150 
 Between  14.125 Countries = 25 
 Within  2.909   Time periods =  6 
 
  
64 
 
References 
 
Aghion, P., Caroli, E., Garcia-Penalosa, C., 1999. “Inequality and 
Economic Growth: the Perspective of New Growth Theories.” 
Journal of Economic Literature 37(4), 1615-1660. 
 
Alesina, A., Perotti, R., 1994. “The Political Economy of Growth: a 
Critical Survey of the Recent Literature.” World Bank Economic 
Review 8(3), 351-371. 
 
Atkinson, A. B., 1997. “Bringing Income Distribution in from the 
cold.” Economic Journal 107(441), 297-321. 
 
Atkinson, A. B., 2001. “A critique on the Transatlantic Consensus on 
rising Income Inequality.” The World Economy, 24(4), 433-52. 
 
Atkinson, A. B., Cantillon, B., Marlier, E., Nolan, B., 2005. “Taking 
Forward the EU Social Inclusion Process.” Final version dated 31 
July 2005, Independent Report Commissioned by the Luxembourg 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
 
Atkinson, A.B., 2007. “The Distribution of Earnings in OECD 
Countries.” International Labour Review 146(1-2), 41-60. 
 
Atkinson, A.B., 2008. “The Changing Distribution of Earnings in 
OECD Countries.” Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Atkinson, A.B., Brandolini, A., 2009. “On Data: A Case Study of the 
Evolution of Income Inequality across Time and across Countries.” 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 33(3), 381-404. 
 
Bargain, O., Callan, T., 2010. “Analysing the Effects of Tax-benefits 
Reforms on Income Distribution: A Decomposition Approach.” 
Journal of Economic Inequality 8(1), 1-21. 
 
Barro, R. J., 2000. “Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries.” 
Journal of Economic Growth 5(1), 5-32. 
65 
 
Behr, A., Potter, U., 2010. “What Determines Wage Differentials 
across the EU?” Journal of Economic Inequality 8(1), 101-120. 
 
Bentolila, S., Saint-Paul, G., 2003. “Explaining Movements in the 
Labor Share.” Contributions to Macroeconomics 3(1), article 9. 
 
Bertola, G., 2010. “Inequality, Integration and Policy: Issues and 
Evidence from EMU.” Journal of Economic Inequality 8(3), 345-
365. 
 
Black, S.E., Devereux, P. J., 2010. “Recent Developments in 
Intergenerational Mobility.” NBER Working papers, n. 15889, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. 
 
Blanchard, O., Wolfers, J., 2000. “The Role of Shocks and 
Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: the Aggregate 
Evidence.” The Economic Journal 110(462), C1-C33.  
 
BonesmoFredriksen, K., 2012. “Income Inequality in the European 
Union.” OECD Economic Department Working Papers n. 952, 
OECD Publishing, Paris. 
 
Bourguignon, F., 2005. “The Effect of Economic Growth on Social 
Structures.” In: Aghion, P., Durlauf, S. (Eds), The Handbook of 
Economic Growth, vol. 1B, Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 1701-1747. 
 
Braga, M., Checchi, D., Meschi, E., 2011. “Institutional Reforms and 
Educational Attainment in Europe: A Long Run Perspective.” IZA 
Discussion Papers n. 6190, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 
Bonn. 
 
Brandolini, A., 2007. “Measurement of Income Distribution in 
Supranational Entities: the case of European Union.”Temi di 
discussione del Servizio Studi n. 623, Banca d’Italia, Rome, april. 
 
Breen, R., Jonsson, J., 2007. “Explaining Change in Social Fluidity: 
66 
 
Educational Equalization and Educational Expansion in Twentieth-
Century Sweden.” The American Journal of Sociology 112(6), 1775-
1810.  
 
Canberra Group, 2001. “Expert Group on Household Income 
Statistics.” Final Report and Recommendations, Ottawa. 
 
Chapman, B., 2006. “Income Contingent Loans for Higher 
Education: International Reforms.” In: Hanushek, E., Welch, F., 
(Eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Education, vol. 2(2), Elsevier, 
Amsterdam, pp. 1435-1503. 
 
Checchi, D., Peragine, V., Serlenga, L., 2010. “Fair and Unfair 
Income Inequalities in Europe.” IZA Discussion Papers n. 5025, 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn. 
 
Chen, W., Corak, M., 2005. “Child Poverty and Changes in Child 
Poverty in rich Countries Since 1990.” IZA Discussion Papers n. 
1574, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn. 
 
Chusseau, N., Dumont, M., Hellier, J., 2008. “Explaining Rising 
Inequality: Skill-Biased Technical Change and North-South Trade.” 
Journal of Economic Survey 22(3), 409-457. 
 
Cornia, G. A., Court, J., 2001. “Inequality, Growth and Poverty in 
the Era of Liberalization and Globalization.” Policy Brief 4, WIDER, 
United Nation University, New York. 
 
Corak, M., Piraino, P., 2011. “The Intergenerational Transmission of 
Employers.” Journal of Labor Economics 29(1), 37-68. 
 
Cushing, M. J., McGarvey, M. G., 1999. “Covariance matrix 
estimation.” In: Laszlo, M., (Ed.), Generalized Methods of Moments 
Estimation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 63-95. 
 
D’Addio, A. C., 2007. “Intergenerational Transmission of 
67 
 
Disadvantage: Mobility or Immobility across Generations? A 
Review of Evidence for OECD Countries.” OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Working Papers n. 52, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
 
Dardoni, V., Lambert, P., 2002. “Progressivity Comparisons.” 
Journal of Public Economics 86(1), 99-122. 
 
Dauderstadt, M., Kelmtek, C., 2011. “Immeasurable Inequality in the 
European Union.” Intereconomics 46(1), 44-51. 
 
Deininger, K., Squire, L., 2000. “A new data set measuring income 
inequality.” World Bank Economic Review 10(3), 565-591. 
 
Drukker, D. M., 2003. “Testing for serial correlation in linear panel-
data models.”Stata Journal 3(2), 168-177. 
 
Erikson, R., Goldthorpe, J. H. (2002), “Intergenerational Inequality. 
A Sociological Perspective.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 
16(3), 31-44. 
 
Esping-Andersen, G., Gallie, D., Hemerijck, A., Myles, J., 2002. 
“Why we need a New Welfare State.” Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
 
European Central Bank (ECB), 2009. “Eurosystem Household 
Finance and Consumption Network. Survey Data on Household 
Finance and Consumption: Research Summary and policy Use.” 
ECB Occasional Paper n. 100, January, European Central Bank, 
Frankfurt am Main. 
 
European Commission (EC), 2008. “Social Inclusion and Income 
Distribution in the European Union. Monitoring Report 2007.” 
European Observatory on the Social Situation and Demography, 
European Commission, Luxembourg. 
 
68 
 
Eurostat, 2011. “Population and Social Conditions.” Statistics in 
Focus 17/2011. 
 
Forster, M., 2000. “Trends and Driving Factors in Income 
Distribution and Poverty in the OECD Area.” OECD Labour Market 
and Social Policy Occasional Papers n. 42, OECD Publishing, Paris.  
 
Forster, M., d’Ercole, M. M., 2005. “Income Distribution and 
poverty in OECD Countries in the Second Half of the 1990s.” OECD 
Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers n. 22, OECD 
Publishing, Paris. 
 
Fraßdorf, A., Grabka, M. M., Scharze, F. J., 2008. “The impact of 
household capital income on income inequality: A factor 
decomposition analysis for Great Britain, Germany and the 
USA.”Society for the Study of Economic Inequality (ECINEQ), 
Working Papers n. 89, June. 
 
Frazer, G., 2006. “Inequality and Development Across and Within 
Countries.” World Development 34(9), 1459-1481. 
 
Frees, E. W., 1995. “Assessing cross-sectional correlations in panel 
data.” Journal of Econometrics 69(2), 393-414. 
 
Frees, E. W., 2004. “Longitudinal and panel data: analysis and 
applications in the social sciences.” Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
 
GHK, 2010. “Social Mobility and Intra-regional Income Distribution 
across EU Member States.” Final Report, DG Regional Policy, 
2008CE160AT054/2008CE16CAT017. 
 
Gottschalk, P., Smeeding, T. M., 1997. “Cross-national Comparisons 
of Earnings and Income Inequalities.” Journal of Economic 
Literature 35(2), 633-687. 
 
69 
 
Harkness, S., 2010. “The Contribution of Women’s Employment and 
Earnings to Household Income Inequality.” Luxembourg Income 
Study Working Paper n. 531, June. 
 
The Heritage Foundation, “The 2012 Index of Economic Freedom”. 
http://www.heritage.org/index (accessed 2011-2012). 
 
Iannelli, C., 2002. “Parental Education and Young People 
Educational and Labour Market Outcomes: A Comparison across 
Europe.”MannheimerZentrum fur EuropaischeSozialforschung 
(MZES) Working Paper 45, Mannheimer.   
 
Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H., Shin, Y. 2003. “Testing for unit roots in 
heterogeneous panels.” Journal of Econometrics 115(1), 53–74. 
 
Immervoll, H., Richardson, L., 2011. “Redistribution Policy and 
Inequality Reduction in OECD Countries: What Has Changed in 
Two Decades?” OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working 
Papers, 122, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
 
Jenkins, S., Van Kerm, P., 2006. “Trends in Income Inequality, Pro-
poor Income Growth and Income Mobility.” Oxford Economic 
Papers 58, 531-548. 
 
Koeninger, W., Leonardi, M., Nunziata, L., 2007. “Labour Market 
Institutions and Wage Inequality.” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 60(3), 340-356. 
 
Kuznets, S., 1955. “Economic Growth and Income Inequality.” 
American Economic Review 65(1), 1-28. 
 
Levin, A., Lin, C.-F., Chu, C.-S. J., 2002. “Unit root tests in panel 
data: Asymptotic and finite-sample properties.” Journal of 
Econometrics 108(1), 1–24. 
 
Marks, G., 2005. “Cross-national Differences and Accounting for 
70 
 
Social Class Inequalities in Education.” International Sociology 
20(4), 483-505. 
 
Marrero, G. A., Rodriguez, J. G., 2010. “Inequality of Opportunity in 
Europe: Economic and Policy Facts.” Society for the Study of 
Economic Inequality (ECINEQ), Working Papers n. 172, May. 
 
Milanovic, B., 1994. “Determinants of Cross-country Income 
Inequality: an Augmented Kuznets Hypothesis.” Policy Research 
Working Paper Series 1246, World Bank, Washington. 
 
OECD, 2008. “Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty 
in OECD Countries.” OECD Publishing, Paris. 
 
OECD, 2011. “Divided We Stand. Why Inequality Keeps Rising.” 
OECD Publishing, Paris. 
 
Paulus, A., Sutherland, H., Tsakloglou, P., 2010. “The Distributional 
Impact of In-Kind Public Benefits in European Countries.” Journal 
of Policy Analysis and Management 29(2), 243-266. 
 
Pesaran, M. H., 2004. “General diagnostic tests for cross section 
dependence in panels.” Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 
0435, University of Cambridge, Cambridge UK. 
 
Polity IV Project, “Polity IV Data Series 2011.” “Polity IV Country 
Report 2010.” http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
(accessed 2011-2012). 
 
Ravallion, M., Chen, S., 1997. “What can new Survey Data tell us 
about recent Changes in Distribution and Poverty?” World Bank 
Economic Review 11(2), 357-382. 
 
Ravalillon, M., 2004. “Pro-poor Growth. A primer.” World Bank 
Research Working Paper 3242, World Bank, Washington. 
 
71 
 
Redmond, G., Kattuman, P., 2001. “Employment Polarisation and 
Inequality in the UK and Hungary.” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 25(4), 467-480. 
 
Roemer, J. E., 1998. “Equality of Opportunities.” Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge MA. 
 
Sandor, E., 2011. “Part-time Work in Europe: European Company 
Survey 2009.”European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Condition, Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg. 
 
Shavit, Y., Arum, R., Gamoran, A., Menahem, G. (Eds.), 2007. 
“Stratification in higher Education: a comparative study.” Stanford 
University Press, Palo Alto. 
 
Shorrocks, A., F., 1983. “The Impact of Income Components on the 
Distribution of Family Incomes.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
98(2), 311-326.  
 
Smeeding, T. M., Weinberg, D.H., 2001. “Towards a Uniform 
Definition of Household Income.” The Review of Income and 
Wealth 47(1), 1-24. 
 
Spector, D., 2004. “Competition and the Capital-Labor Conflict.” 
European Economic Review 48(1), 25-38. 
 
Vaalavuo, M., 2010. “The Impact of Public Services on Inequality in 
Income Distribution in the Nordic Welfare States.” In: Sauders, P., 
Sainsbury, R. (Eds.), Social Security, Poverty and Social Exclusion 
in Rich and Poorer Countries, International Studies on Social 
Security 16, Intersentia, Antwerp, 133-152. 
 
Villar, A., 2006. “On the Welfare Evaluation of Income and 
Opportunity. Contributions to Theoretical Economics.” Berkeley 
Electronic Press, 5, issue 1, June, ISSN (Online) 1534-5971, 
DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1129. 
72 
 
Ward, T., Lelkes, O., Sutherland, H., Toth, I. Gy., 2009. “European 
Inequalities. Social Inclusion and Income Distribution in the 
European Union.” TARKI Social Research Institute Inc., Budapest.  
 
World Bank, 2006. “World Development Report 2006: Equity and 
Development.” Washington D.C., The World Bank and Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
 
Wooldridge, J. M., 2002. “Econometric Analysis of Cross Section 
and Panel Data.” MIT press, Princeton, NJ. 
 
  
73 
 
 
Elenco 
Quaderni già pubblicati 
 
 
 
1. Capitalismo senza capitale. Il capitalismo italiano delle 
diversità.L. Campiglio, luglio 1993. 
2. Credibility and Populism in the Management of a Public Social 
Security System. L. Bonatti, luglio 1993. 
3. Il ruolo delle NonprofitOrganizations nella produzione di 
servizi sanitari.R. Creatini, dicembre 1993. 
4. Technological Change, Diffusion and Output Growth. M. 
Baussola, dicembre 1993. 
5. Europe: the Trademark is Still on the Mark.  L. 
Campiglio, gennaio 1994. 
6. A Cointegration Approach to the Monetary Model of the 
Exchange Rate. M. Arnone, febbraio 1994. 
7. Gli effetti del debito pubblico quando la ricchezza è un fine e 
non solo un mezzo. V. Moramarco, maggio 1994. 
8. Emissioni inquinanti, asimmetria informativa ed efficacia delle 
imposte correttive. R. Creatini, settembre 1994. 
9. La disoccupazione in Europa. L. Campiglio, novembre 1994. 
10. The Economics of Voting and Non-Voting: Democracy and 
Economic Efficiency. L. Campiglio, gennaio 1995. 
11. The Banking Law and its Influence on the Evolution of the 
Italian Financial System. C. Bellavite Pellegrini, maggio 1995. 
12. Monetary Authorities, Economic Policy and Influences in the 
Capital Market in Italy 1960-1982. C. Bellavite Pellegrini, 
giugno 1995. 
13. A General Model to Study Alternative Approaches to 
Economywide Models in a Transaction Values (TV) Context. F. 
Timpano, giugno 1995. 
14. Economia legale ed economia illegale: schemi interpretativi 
della coesistenza. D. Marino, F. Timpano, luglio 1995. 
74 
 
15. Il problema del cambiamento dei coefficienti nel contesto di una 
matrice di contabilità sociale regionalizzata. F. Timpano, 
settembre 1995. 
16. La dimensione transnazionale dell’inquinamento marino: le 
convenzioni internazionali tra teoria e pratica. G. Malerba, 
giugno 1996. 
17. Efficienza, stabilità degli intermediari e crescita del reddito: un 
modello teorico. C. Bellavite Pellegrini, novembre 1996. 
18. Innovation and the World Economy: How will our (Grand) 
Children Earn a Living?, L. Campiglio, P. J. Hammond, 
gennaio 1997. 
19. Evaluating Private Intergenerational Transfers between 
Households. The Case of Italy. F. Tartamella, febbraio 1997. 
20. Qualità e regolamentazione. R. Creatini, maggio 1997. 
21. Wage Differentials, the Profit-Wage Relationship and the 
Minimum Wage. G. Quintini, giugno 1997. 
22. Potere e rappresentatività nel Parlamento Italiano: una 
prospettiva economica. L. Campiglio, luglio 1997. 
23. Exchange Rate, Herd Behaviour and Multiple Equilibria. M. 
Arnone, settembre 1997. 
24. Rank, Stock, Order and Epidemic Effects in the Diffusion of 
New Technologies in Italian Manufacturing Industries. E. 
Bartoloni, M. Baussola, dicembre 1997. 
25. Stabilità ed Efficienza del Sistema Finanziario Italiano: una 
Verifica Empirica. M. Manera, C. Bellavite Pellegrini, gennaio 
1998. 
26. EndogenousUncertainty and Market Volatility. M. Kurz, M. 
Motolese, aprile 1999. 
27. Famiglia, distribuzione del reddito e politiche familiari: una 
survey della letteratura degli anni Novanta. Parte prima: I 
nuovi fenomeni e i vecchi squilibri delle politiche sociali. G. 
Malerba, aprile 2000. 
28. Modelli di Agenzie di sviluppo regionale: analisi teorica ed 
evidenza empirica. M. Arnone, C. Bellavite Pellegrini, F. 
Timpano, aprile 2000. 
75 
 
29. Endogenous Uncertainty and the Non-neutrality of Money. M. 
Motolese, maggio 2000. 
30. Growth, Persistent Regional Disparities and Monetary Policy in 
a Model with Imperfect Labor Markets. L. Bonatti, maggio 
2001. 
31. Two Arguments against the Effectiveness of Mandatory 
Reductions in the Workweek as a Job Creation Policy. L. 
Bonatti, maggio 2001. 
32. Growth and Employment Differentials under Alternative Wage-
Setting Institutions and Integrated Capital Markets. L. Bonatti, 
maggio 2001. 
33. Attività innovativa e spillovers tecnologici: una rassegna 
dell'analisi teorica. A. Guarino, maggio 2001. 
34. Famiglia, distribuzione del reddito e politiche familiari: una 
survey della letteratura italiana degli anni Novanta. Parte 
seconda: La riforma del Welfare e le sue contraddizioni. G. 
Malerba, giugno 2001. 
35. Changeover e inflazione a Milano. L. Campiglio, V. Negri, 
giugno 2002. 
36. Prezzi e inflazione nel mercato dell’auto in Italia. L. Campiglio, 
A. Longhi, ottobre 2002. 
37. Interessi economici, potere politico e rappresentanza 
parlamentare in Italia nel periodo 1948-2002. L. Campiglio, F. 
Lipari, maggio 2003. 
38. Dai consumi interni a quelli dei residenti: una stima 
preliminare a livello regionale. C. Corea, giugno 2003. 
39. Studio delle relazioni tra spesa familiare e caratteri sociali, 
demografici ed economici delle famiglie italiane: un’analisi a 
livello sub-nazionale. A. Coli, giugno 2003. 
40. L’utilizzo delle indagini su redditi e consumi nella derivazione 
di indicatori per scomporre i dati di Contabilità Nazionale. Un 
caso riferito all’analisi regionale. F. Tartamella, giugno 2003. 
41. Segnali di disagio economico nel tenore di vita delle famiglie 
italiane: un confronto tra regioni. G. Malerba, S. Platoni, luglio 
2003. 
76 
 
42. Rational Overconfidence and Excess Volatility in General 
Equilibrium. C.K. Nielsen, febbraio 2004. 
43. How Ethnic Fragmentation And Cultural Distance Affect Moral 
Hazard in Developing Countries: a Theoretical Analysis. T. 
Gabrieli, febbraio 2004. 
44. Industrial Agglomeration: Economic Geography, Technological 
 Spillover, and Policy incentives. E. Bracco, ottobre 2005. 
45. An Introduction to the Economics of Conflict, a Survey of 
Theoretical Economic Models of Conflict. R. Caruso, ottobre 
2005. 
46. A Model of Conflict with Institutional Constraint in a two-
period Setting. What is a Credible Grant?, R. Caruso, ottobre 
2005. 
47. On the Concept of Administered Prices. L. Gattini, dicembre 
2005. 
48. Architecture of Financial Supervisory Authorities and the Basel 
Core Principles. M. Arnone, A. Gambini, marzo 2006. 
49. Optimal Economic Institutions Under Rational Overconfidence. 
With applications to The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime and 
the Design of Social Security. C.K. Nielsen, aprile 2006. 
50. Indicatori di vulnerabilità economica nelle regioni italiane: 
un’analisi dei bilanci familiari. G. Malerba, giugno 2006. 
51. Risk Premia, Diverse Beliefs and Beauty Contests. M. Kurz, M. 
Motolese, gennaio 2007. 
52. Le disuguaglianze regionali nella distribuzione del reddito. 
Parte prima: Un’analisi della povertà delle famiglie italiane. G. 
Malerba, dicembre 2009. 
53. What do we know about the link between growth and 
institutions?, M. Spreafico,maggio 2010. 
54. Economic Institutions and Economic Growth in the Former 
Soviet Union Economies. M. Spreafico, maggio 2010. 
55. Famiglia, figli e sviluppo sostenibile. L. Campiglio, settembre 
2011. 
56. Le determinanti politico-economiche della distribuzione 
interregionale della spesa pubblica. V. Moramarco, ottobre 
2011. 
77 
 
57. Le disuguaglianze regionali nella distribuzione del reddito. 
Parte seconda: Un’analisi delle famiglie italiane a rischio di 
povertà. G. Malerba, ottobre 2011. 
58. Libertà del vivere una vita civile e deprivazione economica. L. 
Campiglio, ottobre 2011. 
59. Europa, crescita e sostenibilità: “E Pluribus Unum”. L. 
Campiglio, Vita e Pensiero, febbraio 2012 (ISBN 978-88-343-
2215-4). 
60. Market’s SINS and the European Welfare State: theory and 
empirical evidences. L. Campiglio, Vita e Pensiero, settembre 
2012 (ISBN 978-88-343-2323-6). 
61. Brutality of Jihadist Terrorism. A contest theory perspective and 
empirical evidence in the period 2002-2010. R. Caruso, F. 
Schneider, Vita e Pensiero, ottobre 2012 (ISBN 978-88-343-
2360-1). 
62. Hooliganism and demand for football in Italy. Evidence for the 
period 1962-2011.R. Caruso, M. di Domizio, Vita e Pensiero, 
novembre 2012 (ISBN 978-88-343-2368-7). 
63. Why Italy’s saving rate became (so) low?, L. Campiglio, Vita e 
Pensiero, febbraio 2013 (ISBN 978-88-343-2500-1). 
64. Institutions, the resource curse and the transition economies: 
further evidence, M. Spreafico, Vita e Pensiero, aprile 2013 
(ISBN 978-88-343-2551-3). 
65. Income inequality in the European Union: evidence from a 
panel analysis, G. Malerba, M. Spreafico, Vita e Pensiero, 
aprile 2013 (ISBN 978-88-343-2553-7). 
 
 
  
78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Printed by 
Gi&Gi srl - Triuggio (MB)  
April 2013 
ISTITUTO DI POLITICA ECONOMICA 
Income inequality in the European Union:
evidence from a panel analysis
Giuseppina Malerba
Marta Spreafico
Quaderno n. 65/aprile 2013
VITA E PENSIERO
788834 3255379 >
ISBN 978-88-343-2553-7
     
   
     
      
      
     
       
      
  
  
         
COP Malerba-Spreafico.qxd:_  11/04/13 14:13  Page 1
